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I.	INTRODUCTION	The	 goal	 of	 any	 criminal	 enterprise,	 whether	 it’s	 human	trafficking,	 drug	 dealing,	 or	 any	 other	 organized	 crime,	 is	 to	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1391	generate	 a	 profit. 1 	However,	 after	 earning	 their	 illegal	 gains,	criminals	must	 introduce	 those	 funds	 into	 a	 legitimate	 financial	system,	 lest	 they	 risk	 raising	 the	 suspicion	 of	 law	 enforcement	officers	 or	 leaving	 a	 trail	 of	 incriminating	 evidence. 2 	Money	laundering	is	the	process	criminals	use	to	disguise	their	financial	assets	so	that	they	can	spend	their	ill-gotten	gains	without	risking	exposing	 their	 underlying	 crimes. 3 	Therefore,	 since	 money	laundering	 provides	 the	 “fuel	 for	 drug	 dealers,	 terrorists,	 arms	dealers,	and	other	criminals	to	operate	and	expand	their	criminal	enterprises,”	 reducing	 money	 laundering	 is	 critical	 to	 reducing	international	 and	 domestic	 criminal	 activities. 4 	However,	 the	current	anti-money	 laundering	 (“AML”)	 legislative	 framework	 in	the	United	States,	the	Bank	Secrecy	Act	of	1970	(the	“BSA”),5	has	been	 ineffective	 in	 significantly	 curtailing	 domestic	 money	laundering.6	One	proposal	to	address	the	weaknesses	of	AML	regulations,	which	 has	 gained	 traction	 internationally,	 is	 to	 expand	 the	regulations	to	cover	lawyers.7	Lawyers,	through	their	specialized	expertise,	allow	criminals	to	create	legal	vehicles	that	can	subvert	AML	 regulations	 and	 facilitate	 money	 laundering, 8 	specifically	
 1.	 See	 Fin.	 Action	 Task	 Force,	 What	 is	 Money	 Laundering?,	 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/	 [perma.cc/HA73-TD3P]	 (last	visited	Apr.	11,	2020);	see	
also	 United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime,	 Introduction	 to	 money-laundering,	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/introduction.html?ref=menuside	[perma.cc/DU99-ZESH]	(last	visited	Apr.	11,	2020).	2.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,		supra	note	1.	3.		See	id.;	see	also	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Treasury,	Money	Laundering,	https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/terrorism-and-illicit-finance/money-laundering	 [perma.cc/6T7R-PNVE]	 (last	 visited	 Apr.	 14,	 2020);	 Rebecca	 Gregory,	 The	
Lawyer’s	 Role:	 Will	 Uncle	 Sam	 Want	 You	 in	 the	 Fight	 against	 Money	 Laundering	 and	
Terrorism?,	 72	 UMKC	 L.	 REV.	 23,	 23n.1	 (2003)	 (“For	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 elements	 the	government	must	prove	to	establish	money	laundering,	see,	for	example,	United	States	v.	Kneeland,	148	F.3d	6,	17	(1st	Cir.	1998),	United	States	v.	Isabel,	945	F.2d	1193,	1200-04	(1st	Cir.	1991),	United	States	v.	Massac,	867	F.2d	174,	177-78	(3d	Cir.	1989).”).	4.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	1.	5.		See	Fin.	Crimes	Enforcement	Network,	What	We	Do,		https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do	[perma.cc/2S7W-AD5P]	(last	visited	Apr.	20,	2020).	6.	 See	infra	Part	II.B.1.	7.	 See	 Fin.	 Action	 Task	 Force,	 International	 Standards	 On	 Combating	 Money	Laundering	and	the	Financing	of	Terrorism	&	Proliferation:	The	FATF	Recommendations	¶22	 (2018),	 https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/internationalstandardsoncombatingmoneylaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismproliferationthefatfrecommendations.html	[perma.cc/ACA5-8RFY].	8.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	notes	180-81.	
1392	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	through	the	use	of	anonymous	shell	corporations.9	However,	in	the	United	States,	enforcement	of	AML	regulations	by	lawyers	remains	voluntary	and	patchwork10	and	the	American	Bar	Association	(the	“ABA”)	opposes	expanding	mandatory	AML	compliance	to	the	legal	profession.11	One	 country	 that	 has	 expanded	 AML	 regulations	 to	 cover	lawyers,	however,	is	the	United	Kingdom.12	In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	two	pieces	of	legislation	that	address	AML	regulations	are	the	U.K.	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2007	(the	“Regulations	2007”)	and	 the	 Proceeds	 of	 Crime	 Act	 2002	 (“POCA”). 13 	The	 United	Kingdom	initially	extended	some	of	its	AML	regulations	to	lawyers	in	response	to	a	2001	directive	from	the	European	Union,14	but	in	December	 2007,	 it	 formally	 adopted	 the	 Regulations	 2007	 that	were	drafted	 to	conform	with	 international	standards	set	by	 the	Financial	Action	Task	Force	(“FATF”).15	Part	 II	 of	 this	 Note	 examines	 the	 current	 AML	 regulatory	framework	in	the	United	States,	including	how	the	BSA	regulates	financial	 institutions,	 the	 impact	 it	 has	 had	 on	 them,	 and	 how	American	 lawyers	 currently	 self-regulate	 AML	 risks.	 Part	 III	explores	how	the	United	Kingdom	expanded	its	AML	regulations	to	the	legal	field,	including	an	analysis	of	the	international	standards	it	adopted	from	the	FATF’s	“RBA	Guidance	for	Legal	Professionals”	(the	“Lawyer’s	Guidance”),	and	why	the	ABA	opposes	adopting	the	United	 Kingdom’s	 approach	 to	 regulating	 lawyers.	 Part	 IV	recommends	 that	 the	United	States	 should	not	adopt	 the	United	Kingdom’s	 approach	 of	 mandating	 AML	 regulations	 in	 the	 legal	field.	
 9.	 See	infra	Part	II.B.1.a.	10.	 See	infra	Part	II.C.	11.	 See	infra	Part	III.C.	12.	 See	 FIN.	 ACTION	 TASK	 FORCE,	 ANTI-MONEY	 LAUNDERING	 AND	 COUNTER-TERRORIST	FINANCING	 MEASURES:	 UNITED	 KINGDOM	 MUTUAL	 EVALUATION	 REPORT	 208	 (Dec.	 2018),	https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf	[perma.cc/ML8F-E25Q];	see	also	infra	Part	III.A.	13.	 See	infra	Part	III.A.1.	14.	 See	Colin	Tyre,	Anti-Money	Laundering	Legislation:	 Implementation	of	 the	FATF	
Forty	Recommendations	in	the	European	Union,	J.	PROF.	L.	69,	76	(2010).	15 .	 Compare	 id.	 at	 79,	with	 European	 Commission	 Press	 Release	 MEMO/12/112,		Frequently	 asked	questions:	 EU	 fight	 against	money-laundering	 and	 terrorist	 financing	moves	up	 a	 gear:	European	Commission	 takes	 action	 to	meet	 the	 revised	 international	standards	adopted	by	the	Financial	Action	Task	Force	(Feb.	16,	2012).	
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II.	CURRENT	ANTI-MONEY	LAUNDERING	REGULATIONS	IN	THE	
UNITED	STATES	In	 the	United	 States,	 the	 framework	 for	AML	 regulations	of	financial	 institutions	 is	 the	 BSA. 16 	The	 BSA	 requires	 financial	institutions	 to	 assist	 US	 government	 agencies	 in	 detecting	 and	preventing	 money	 laundering	 through	 internal	 control	 and	reporting	 requirements. 17 	However,	 the	 BSA’s	 impact	 on	 the	amount	of	money	laundered	in	the	United	States	is	unclear	thus	far,	and	there	is	evidence	that	it	has	not	impacted	the	amount	of	money	laundered	at	all.18	Further,	the	costs	of	these	regulations	may	have	led	to	unintended	consequences.19	While	the	BSA	has	historically	and	primarily	 targeted	banks,20	in	 recent	 years	 other	 industries,	including	casinos,	card	clubs,	and	money	service	businesses,	have	fallen	 under	 certain	 regulations	 within	 the	 BSA.21	However,	 the	BSA	regulations	have	never	been	expanded	to	legal	professionals,	leaving	lawyers	free	to	self-regulate	how	they	address	AML	risks	through	ethical	rules	and	ABA	educational	programs.22	
 16.	 See	 Office	 of	 the	 Comptroller	 of	 the	 Currency,	 Bank	 Secrecy	 Act	 (BSA),	https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/bsa/index-bsa.html	 [perma.cc/ST83-39TR]	(last	visited	Apr.	14,	2020);	see	also	FDIC,	Bank	Secrecy	Act/Anti-Money	Laundering,	https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/bsa/index.html	 [perma.cc/QR2Q-N5LP]	(last	visited	Apr.	11,	2020).	17.		See	Fin.	Crimes	Enf’t	Network,	FinCEN’s	Mandate	From	Congress,	https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations	 [perma.cc/7QV2-HJVT]	 (last	visited	Apr.	20,	2020).	18.	 See	infra	Part	II.B.1.	19.	 See	infra	Part	II.B.2.	20.	 See	generally	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency,	supra	note	16.	21.	 See	generally	31	C.F.R.	§§	1020-1030	(listing	the	different	types	of	entities	that	FinCEN	regulates).	A	money	service	business	includes	any	person	offering	“check	cashing;	foreign	currency	exchange	services;	or	selling	money	orders,	travelers’	checks	or	pre-paid	access	(formerly	stored	value)	products”	or	who	“engage[]	as	a	business	in	the	transfer	of	funds.”	 See	 Internal	 Revenue	 Serv.,	Money	 Services	 Business	 (MSB)	 Information	 Center,	https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/money-services-business-msb-information-center	[perma.cc/AG5N-T6M5]	(last	visited	Apr.	11,	2020);	see	
also	 Fin.	 Crimes	 Enf’t	 Network,	 Money	 Services	 Business	 Definition,	https://www.fincen.gov/money-services-business-definition	 [perma.cc/V6VV-7563]	(last	visited	Apr.	11,	2020).	22.	 See	infra	Part	II.C.	
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A.	The	Bank	Secrecy	Act	As	Applied	To	US	Financial	Institutions	1.	AML	Compliance	Requirements	Currently,	the	BSA	requires	US	financial	institutions	to	assist	US	 government	 agencies	 in	 detecting	 and	 preventing	 money	laundering, 23 	and	 the	 Financial	 Crimes	 Enforcement	 Network	(“FinCEN”),	which	covers	more	than	80,000	financial	institutions,24	oversees	 the	BSA’s	 implementation	 and	 enforcement.25	The	BSA	requires	financial	institutions	to	implement	an	AML	program	that	includes:	 (1)	 internal	 controls	 to	 ensure	 BSA	 compliance;	 (2)	independent	compliance	testing;	(3)	designating	a	BSA	compliance	officer;	(4)	employee	training;	and	(5)	risk-based	procedures	for	conducting	ongoing	customer	due	diligence,	which	should	include:	(i)	 understanding	 the	 nature	 and	 purpose	 of	 customer	relationships	 to	 develop	 a	 customer	 risk	 profile,	 and	 (ii)	conducting	ongoing	monitoring	to	 identify	and	report	suspicious	transactions,	and	maintaining	and	updating	customer	information	and	 beneficial	 ownership	 information. 26 	The	 statute	 and	regulations	do	not	dictate	the	specifics	of	these	programs,	instead,	they	allow	each	financial	institution	to	tailor	its	program	to	its	size,	location,	and	business	activities.27	Banks	must	tailor	their	AML	programs	to	their	specific	risks	by	first	assessing	their	vulnerabilities	to	money	laundering.28	This	risk	 depends	 on	 a	 bank’s	 (1)	 offered	 products	 and	 services,	 (2)	
 23.	 	See	Fin.	Crimes	Enf’t	Network,		supra	note	17;	see	also	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	 the	 Currency,	 supra	 note	 16;	 31	 U.S.C.	 §	 5312(a)(2)	 (1970)	 (defining	 “financial	institution”).	24.	 See	 Statement	 of	 Jamal	 El-Hindi,	 Acting	 Dir.,	 FinCEN	 U.S.	 Dep’t	 of	 the	 Treasury	
Before	the	H.	Subcomm.	On	Terrorism	and	Illicit	Fin.,	115th	Cong.	3	(2017).	Approximately	4,700	of	these	covered	financial	institutions	are	commercial	banks.	See	FDIC,	Statistics	At	
A	 Glance	 As	 of	 December	 31,	 2018,	https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2018dec/industry.pdf	 [perma.cc/X7J8-UQ4G]	(last	visited	Apr.	11,	2020).	25.	 See	Fin.	Crimes	Enf’t	Network,	supra	note	17.	26.	 31	C.F.R.	§	1020.210.	27.	 See	Prepared	Remarks	of	FinCEN	Director	 James	H.	Freis,	 Jr.,	 SIMFA	Anti-Money	
Laundering	Compiance	Conference	(Mar.	10,	2008)	(“our	rules	recognize	that	one	size	does	not	fit	all.	.	.	.	Rather,	based	upon	a	risk	assessment,	a	firm	should	focus	its	AML	program,	and	thus	its	finite	AML	compliance	resources,	most	significantly	on	the	areas	of	greatest	risk.”).	28.	 STEVEN	MARK	LEVY,	FEDERAL	MONEY	LAUNDERING	REGULATION:	BANKING,	CORPORATE	&	SECURITIES	COMPLIANCE,	6-24	(2nd	ed.	2020).	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1395	customer	types	served,	and	(3)	geographic	locations.29	Attempts	to	launder	 money	 can	 originate	 from	 many	 sources,	 but	 certain	products,	 services,	 customers,	 entities,	 and	 geographic	 locations	may	be	more	vulnerable	to	abuse.30	Banks	should	evaluate	the	risk	of	certain	products	or	services,	including	ones	that	may	facilitate	greater	anonymity	in	transacting	or	involve	handling	high	volumes	of	 currency, 31 	as	 well	 as	 the	 risk	 posed	 by	 their	 customers	 by	looking	at	the	“nature	of	their	business,	occupation,	or	anticipated	transaction	activity,”32	and	the	specific	risks	of	doing	business	 in	certain	geographic	locations33	where	there	may	be	a	higher	risk	of	illicit	activity.34	 2.	Customer	Due	Diligence	The	 key	 component	 of	 Money	 Laundering	 compliance	 is	Customer	Due	Diligence	(“CDD”).	CDD	“means	understanding	who	the	customers	are	and	what	type	of	transactions	they	conduct.”35	Financial	institutions	must	verify	the	identity	of	their	customers36	and	then	develop	a	customer	risk	profile	based	on	the	nature	and	
 29.	 See	 FED.	 FIN.	 INST.	 EXAMINATION	 COUNCIL,	 BANK	 SECRECY	 ACT/ANTI-MONEY	LAUNDERING	EXAMINATION	MANUAL	19	(2014).	30.	 Id.	31.	 Id.	32.	 Id.	at	20.	33.	 Id.	at	21.	These	higher	risk	geographic	areas	can	include	countries	identified	as	sponsoring	terrorism,	countries	with	weak	AML	regulatory	regimes	of	their	own,	or	areas	in	the	United	States	known	to	have	a	high	degree	of	drug	trafficking.	See	id.	at	21-22.	34.	 	Such	higher	risk	jurisdictions	can	include	“[j]urisdictions	or	countries	monitored	for	deficiencies	in	their	regimes	to	combat	money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing	by	international	entities	such	as	the	Financial	Action	Task	Force	(FATF).”	Id.	at	22.	One	such	recent	 addition	 to	 this	 list	 includes	 Iceland,	 which	 was	 added	 to	 the	 FATF’s	 list	 of	jurisdictions	 with	 strategic	 deficiencies	 on	 October	 18,	 2019	 and	 was	 included	 in	 a	subsequent	FinCEN	Advisory	Notice	for	deficiencies	in	beneficial	ownership	transparency	and	 in	 implementing	 financial	 sanctions.	 See	 FINANCIAL	 ACTION	 TASK	 FORCE,	 IMPROVING	GLOBAL	 AML/CFT	 COMPLIANCE:	 ON-GOING	 PROCESS	 –	 18	 OCTOBER	 2019	 (Oct.	 18,	 2019),	http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/fatf-compliance-october-2019.html	 [perma.cc/39YJ-BGUA];	FINCEN,	ADVISORY	ON	THE	FINANCIAL	ACTION	TASK	FORCE-IDENTIFIED	JURISDICTIONS	WITH	ANTI-MONEY	LAUNDERING	AND	COMBATING	THE	FINANCING	OF	TERRORISM	DEFICIENCIES	AND	RELEVANT	ACTIONS	 BY	 THE	 UNITED	 STATES	 GOVERNMENT	 15	 (Nov.	 12,	 2019),	https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2019-11-12/FATF%20Advisory%20October%202019%20FINAL_508.pdf	 [perma.cc/HQW5-ZY8Y].	35.	 Levy,	supra	note	28,	at	6-36.	36.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	notes	39-40.	
1396	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	purpose	 of	 the	 customer	 relationship, 37 	which	 is	 then	 used	 to	monitor	the	customer’s	activity	for	suspicious	transactions.38	The	financial	 institution	must	verify	 the	 identity	of	each	customer	 to	the	 extent	 reasonable	 and	 practicable	 under	 a	 risk-based	approach39	to	enable	the	bank	to	 form	a	reasonable	belief	 that	 it	knows	the	identity	of	each	customer.40	Further,	to	address	the	risk	that	 individuals	may	use	“straw	men”	 or	 nominees	 to	 shield	 themselves	 from	 identification, 41	effective	May	2018,42	financial	 institutions	are	required	 to	verify	the	identities	of	the	beneficial	owners	behind	their	customers,	or	the	true	owners	of	the	relevant	account.43	This	means	that	financial	institutions	must	verify:	(i)	any	individual	who	owns	twenty-five	percent	or	more	of	 the	equity	of	a	customer;44	(ii)	an	“individual	with	significant	responsibility	to	control,	manage,	or	direct	a	legal	entity	 customer;”	 or	 (iii)	 if	 a	 trust	 owns	 twenty-five	 percent	 or	more	of	a	legal	entity	customer,	the	trustee.45	However,	a	bank	may	rely	 on	 the	 representations	 of	 the	 customer	 itself	 as	 to	 its	 own	beneficial	 ownership	 information,	 even	 if	 provided	 by	 the	nominee.46	 3.	Reporting	Requirements	Under	the	BSA,	financial	institutions	are	also	required	to	“file	reports	 on	 large	 cash	 transactions	 [a	 ‘Currency	 Transaction	Report’	or	‘CTR’],	transactions	that	raise	suspicions	[a	‘Suspicious	Activity	Report’	or	‘SAR’],	and	other	transactions	that	may	relate	to	money	laundering,	terrorism,	or	other	crime.”47	The	CTR	and	SAR	
 37.	 Customer	 Due	 Diligence	 Requirements	 for	 Financial	 Institutions,	 81	 Fed.	 Reg.	29398,	29398,	29420	(May	11,	2016).	38.	 Id.	at	29398,	29420.	39.		See	31	U.S.C.	§	5318	(2014).	40.	 31	C.F.R.	§	1020.220(a)(2).	41.	 Customer	Due	Diligence	Requirements	for	Financial	Institutions,	supra	note	37,	at	29410.	42.	 Customer	Due	Diligence	Requirements	for	Financial	Institutions;	Correction,	82	Fed.	Reg.	45182,	45182	(Sept.	28,	2017).	43.	 31	C.F.R.	§	1010.230.	44 .	 Id.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 financial	 institution	 must	 verify	 the	 identity	 of	 any	individual	who	owns	25%	or	more	of	the	equity	of	the	corporation,	partnership,	or	other	entity	that	is	the	customer	of	the	financial	institution.	45.	 Id.	46.	 Id.	47.	 Levy,	supra	note	28,	at	12-3.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1397	are	the	two	most	common	and	central	reports	filed	by	banks	under	the	 BSA.48 	Financial	 institutions	 are	 required	 to	 file	 a	 CTR	 and	verify	 the	 customer’s	 identification	 for	 each	 transaction	 greater	than	US$10,000.49	Financial	institutions	file	SARs	when	they	detect	“suspicious	activity	related	to	money	laundering,	terrorist	financing,	or	other	criminality.”50	About	1.4	million	and	1.5	million	SARS	were	filed	in	2018	 and	 2017	 respectively. 51 	Financial	 institutions	 are	 in	 a	unique	position	to	serve	as	the	eyes	and	ears	of	 the	government	since	most	money	 laundering	activity	passes	 through	a	 financial	institution	at	least	once,	giving	staff	a	face-to-face	opportunity	to	observe	launderers	when	they	set	up	their	accounts	and	judge	if	their	activity	is	suspicious.52	Banks	are	required	to	maintain	a	copy	of	a	filed	SAR	with	supporting	documentation	for	five	years	after	filing 53 	and	 to	 make	 the	 documentation	 available	 to	 any	 law	enforcement	 or	 federal	 regulator	 examining	 the	 bank’s	 BSA	compliance.54	SARs,	and	any	 information	 that	would	 reveal	 their	existence,	 are	 confidential 55 	and	 financial	 institutions	 are	prohibited	from	notifying	persons	involved	in	a	transaction	that	a	SAR	was	filed.56	
B.	Problems	with	Current	Regulations	The	BSA	has	been	ineffective	in	reducing	the	flow	of	money	laundering	 throughout	 the	 United	 States.57	Instead	 the	 BSA	 has	
 48.	 See	id.	at	13-5.	49.	 See	31	C.F.R.	§	1010.311	(listing	the	other	requirements	for	CTR	filings).	50.	 See	31	U.S.C.	§	5318(g)	(2018);	see	also	31	U.S.C.	§	1010.320	(2018).	51.		See	FinCEN,	Suspicious	Activity	Report	Statistics,		https://www.fincen.gov/reports/sar-stats	 [perma.cc/86HP-ELFF]	 (last	 visited	 Apr.	 14,	2020).	Filtered	for	all	industries	and	states/territories,	for	the	years	2017,	and	2018,	and	for	Money	Laundering	Suspicious	Activity	Category;	see	also	FIN.	ACTION	TASK	FORCE,	ANTI-MONEY	 LAUNDERING	 AND	 COUNTER-TERRORIST	 FINANCING	 MEASURES:	 UNITED	 STATES	 MUTUAL	EVALUATION	REPORT	54	(Dec.	2016)	(noting	an	average	of	1.7	million	SARS	filed	annually	between	2012	and	2014).	52.	 See	Levy,	supra	note	28,	at	14-14.	53.	 31	C.F.R.	§	1020.320.	54.	 Id.	55.		See	id.	§	1020.320(e).	However,	there	are	certain	exceptions	to	this	confidentiality	such	as	with	compliance	audits	or	in	communications	between	banks	concerning	a	joint	SAR.	 See,	 e.g.,	 id.	 §	 1020.320(e)	 (2020);	 12	 C.F.R.	 §	 208.62(j)	 (2020);	 12	 C.F.R.	 §	563.180(d)(12)	(2020);	12	C.F.R.	§	21.11(k)	(2018).	56.	 31	U.S.C.	5318(g)(2)(A)(i)	(2018).	57.	 See	discussion	infra	Part	II.B.1.	
1398	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	been	burdensome	on	banks,	with	many	banks	considering	the	BSA	regulations	to	be	the	most	expensive	regulations	they	face.58	These	regulations	have	 also	driven	many	banks	 to	 have	 to	 consolidate	and	 drop	 certain	 customers,	 reducing	 access	 to	 the	 financial	system	in	the	United	States.59	1.	AML	Regulations	have	not	Proven	to	be	Effective	US	 AML	 regulations	 have	 been	 ineffective	 in	 combating	international	 money	 laundering. 60 	The	 amount	 of	 money	laundered	 globally	 is	 not	 precisely	 known,61 	however	 a	 widely	quoted	estimate	is	“somewhere	between	two	and	five	percent	of	the	world’s	gross	domestic	product,”62	or	about	US$1.5	trillion	to	US$3.7	 trillion	 in	 2015. 63 	Estimates	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 money	laundered	 in	 the	 United	 States	 meanwhile,	 appear	 to	 have	remained	 stable	 at	 approximately	US$300	billion	 per	 year	 since	2010	up	to	as	recently	as	2018.64	
 58.		See	discussion	infra	Part	II.B.2.	59.	 Id.	60.	 See	discussion	infra	Part	II.B.1.	61.	 Fin.	 Action	 Task	 Force,	 supra	 note	 1	 (“[d]ue	 to	 the	 illegal	 nature	 of	 the	transactions,	precise	statistics	are	not	available	and	it	is	therefore	impossible	to	produce	a	definitive	estimate	of	the	amount	of	money	that	is	globally	laundered	every	year.”)	62 .	 Id.;	 see	 also	 United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 &	 Crime,	Money-Laundering	 and	
Globalization,	 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html	[perma.cc/PA4T-JWYE]	 (last	 visited	 Apr.	 14,	 2020);	 United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 &	Crime,	 Illicit	 money:	 how	 much	 is	 out	 there?	 (Oct.	 25,	 2011),	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/illicit-money_-how-much-is-out-there.html	[perma.cc/VU3N-RLCD]	(noting	that	in	2009,	“Criminals,	especially	drug	traffickers,	may	have	laundered	around	$1.6	trillion,	or	2.7	per	cent	of	global	GDP.”).	63.	 John	 A.	 Cassara,	 Countering	 International	 Money	 Laundering	 9	 (2017),	https://thefactcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Countering-International-Money-Laundering-Report-August-2017-FINAL.pdf	 [perma.cc/DP8Q-ME4B].	 This	would	also	be	about	US$1.7	trillion	to	US$4.3	trillion	in	2018.	THE	WORLD	BANK,	GDP	(CURRENT	US$),	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&start=1960&view=chart	[perma.cc/5J5F-PWA3]	(last	visited	Apr.	12,	2020)	(multiplying	two	percent	and	five	percent	by	2018	world	GDP	of	US$85.91	trillion).	64.	 	 	See	Combating	Money	Laundering	and	Other	Forms	of	Illicit	Finance:	Regulator	
and	Law	Enforcement	Perspectives	on	Reform:	Statement	Before	the	S.	Comm.	on	Banking,	
Housing,	&	Urban	Affairs,	115th	Cong.	(2018)	(statement	of	Steven	M.	D’Antuono,	Section	Chief,	Crim.	Division	Fed.	Bureau	of	Investigation)	(“The	U.N.	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crimes	estimates	 that	 annual	 illicit	 proceeds	.	.	.	 of	 crime	 generated	 in	 the	 United	 States	 were	estimated	to	total	approximately	$300	billion	in	2010,	or	about	two	percent	of	the	overall	U.S.	economy	at	the	time.”);	see	also	U.S.	DEP’T	OF	TREASURY,	NATIONAL	MONEY	LAUNDERING	RISK	ASSESSMENT	86	(2015)	(“An	estimated	$300	billion	is	generated	through	illicit	activity	annually	in	the	United	States”);	U.S.	DEP’T	OF	TREASURY,	NATIONAL	MONEY	LAUNDERING	RISK	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1399	Meanwhile,	 the	 crime	 of	 money	 laundering	 itself	 is	 also	significantly	under-enforced.	Less	than	one	percent	of	global	illicit	financial	flows	are	seized	and	forfeited65	and,	in	the	United	States,	money	launderers	face	a	less	than	five	percent	risk	of	conviction	for	 their	 crime.66	In	 absolute	 terms,	 there	 are	only	 about	700	 to	1,200	federal	money	laundering	convictions	per	year	in	the	United	States,	which	is	a	small	amount	considering	this	number	includes	individuals	who	only	had	money	laundering	charges	added	to	an	existing	indictment.67	Further,	there	has	never	been	a	cost-benefit	analysis	undertaken	of	AML	efforts	and	“[t]here	is	no	evidence	that	any	 governments	 have	made	 rigorous	 efforts	 to	weigh	 costs	 [of	AML	regulations]	against	benefits.”68	a.	Anonymous	Shell	Corporations	Form	a	Significant	Barrier	to	AML	Enforcement	A	 key	 deficiency	 driving	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	US	AML	 and	combating	the	financing	of	terrorism	(“CFT”)	measures	has	been	the	abuse	of	creating	anonymous	corporations	(“shell	companies”)	to	hide	beneficial	ownership	information,69	with	the	United	States	
 ASSESSMENT	2	(2018)	(noting	that	the	United	States	continues	to	estimate	that	$300	billion	was	 potentially	 laundered	 in	 2018);	 Press	 Release,	 Am.	 Bar	 Found.,	 Report	 Questions	Global	 Fight	 against	Money	 Laundering	 and	 Terrorism	 (Jan.	 30,	 2014)	 (citing	 TERENCE	HALLIDAY,	 GLOBAL	 SURVEILLANCE	 OF	 DIRTY	 MONEY:	 ASSESSING	 ASSESSMENTS	 OF	 REGIMES	 TO	CONTROL	MONEY-LAUNDERING	AND	COMBAT	THE	FINANCING	OF	TERRORISM	 (2014)	 (noting	no	convincing	evidence	“that	proceeds	of	crime	are	reduced	or	crime	itself	is	better	controlled	with	 anti-money	 laundering	 measures.”)),	http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/news/675	[perma.cc/R3Z7-V8VK].	65.	 Samuel	 Rubenfeld,	 Is	 Anti-Money	 Laundering	 Working?	 No,	 It’s	 Failing,	 WALL	STREET	 J.	 (Nov.	 21,	 2017),	 https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2017/11/21/is-anti-money-laundering-working-no-its-failing/	 [perma.cc/T76U-P7BB];	 see	 also	 United	Nations	Office	 on	Drugs	&	Crime,	Estimating	 Illicit	 Financial	 Flows	Resulting	 from	Drug	
Trafficking	 and	 Other	 Transnational	 Organized	 crimes	 7	 (Oct.	 2011),	https://www.academia.edu/2998395/Estimating_illicit_financial_flows_resulting_from_drug_trafficking_and_other_transnational_organized_crimes	[perma.cc/7ZWA-TELX]		(“Globally,	it	appears	that	much	less	than	1%	(probably	around	0.2%)	of	the	proceeds	of	crime	laundered	via	the	financial	system	are	seized	and	frozen.”).	66.	 Cassara,	supra	note	63,	at	17.	67.	 Id.;	see	also	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	51,	at	64	(“the	U.S.	.	.	.	achieves	over	1200	Federal	ML	convictions	per	year	on	average.”).	68.	 See	Am.	Bar	Found.,	supra	note	64	(citing	Halliday,	supra	note	64).	69.	 	See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	51,	at	4;	see	also	Financial	Secrecy	Index	
2020:	 Narrative	 Report	 on	 USA,	 	 TAX	 JUST.	 NETWORK	 8,	https://fsi.taxjustice.net/PDF/UnitedStates.pdf	 [perma.cc/A86W-MHMM]	 (last	 visited	Mar.	28,	2020)	[hereinafter	Financial	Secrecy	Index]	(noting	how	the	United	States	is	used	as	a	secrecy	jurisdiction	by	foreigners,	including	the	use	of	US	banks	to	launder	money	for	
1400	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	considered	one	of	the	most	secretive	financial	jurisdictions	in	the	world.70	A	shell	company	is	a	company	or	legal	person	formed	with	no	significant	assets	or	operations	in	the	jurisdiction	in	which	it	is	registered.71 	Shell	 corporations	 are	 easy	 to	 set	 up	 and	 “can	 be	[opened]	in	as	little	time	as	it	takes	to	open	up	an	e-mail	account	and	 with	 less	 information	 than	 it	 takes	 to	 sign-up	 for	 a	 library	card.”72	Shell	corporations	can	aid	money	launderers	and	impede	law	enforcement	 investigations	 by	 shielding	 beneficial	 ownership	information.73	Criminals	can	create	a	network	of	shell	corporations	to	increase	the	layers	of	secrecy	and	“hire	[an	unrelated]	nominee”	as	 a	 company	 director	 to	 make	 it	 harder	 for	 law	 enforcement	officers	to	find	the	true	beneficial	owner.74	Banks	can	exacerbate	this	 obfuscation	 by	 failing	 to	 verify	 the	 beneficial	 ownership	 of	shell	corporations,	sometimes	even	accepting	passport	photos	of	a	shell’s	straw-man	without	requiring	any	further	information.75	For	law	firms	that	assist	in	incorporating	these	shells,	many	are	unable	to	assist	law	enforcement	officers	in	identifying	beneficial	owners	because	 they	 do	 not	 work	 with	 potential	 beneficial	 owners	
 Mexican	drug	gangs,	Miami’s	attraction	of	“dirty”	money,	and	how	US	real	estate	is	used	as	a	tax	haven	for	foreign	wealth).	70.	 See	Financial	 Secrecy	 Index,	 supra	 note	69,	 at	1	 (ranking	 the	United	States	 the	second	most	 secretive	 financial	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	world);	 see	also	 Idelys	Martinez,	The	
Shell	Game:	An	Easy	Hide-And-Go	Seek	Game	For	Criminals	Around	the	World,	29	ST.	THOMAS	L.	REV.	185,	197-98	(2017).	71.	 See	Money	Laundering	&	Terrorist	Financing	Through	the	Real	Estate	Sector,	FIN.	ACTION	 TASK	 FORCE	 14	 (Jun.	 29,	 2007),	 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20through%20the%20Real%20Estate%20Sector.pdf	 [perma.cc/ZV4L-UDLR]	 [hereinafter	 Money	 Laundering	 &	
Terrorist	Financing];	see	also	Martinez,	supra	note	70,	at	195	(“In	essence,	shell	companies	are	 business	 entities	 that	 are	 hollow	 and	 are	 intended	 to	 carry	 out	 operations	 in	 the	shadows”).	72.	 See	Martinez,	supra	note	70,	at	196-97;	see	also	Jim	Zarroli,	Want	to	Set	Up	A	Shell	
Corporation	 To	 Hide	 Your	 Millions?	 No	 Problem,	 NPR	 (Apr.	 13,	 2016,	 4:41	 PM),	https://www.npr.org/2016/04/13/474101127/want-to-set-up-a-shell-corporation-to-hide-your-millions-no-problem	[perma.cc/QHW4-SJ5Y]	(“[S]etting	up	a	shell	corporation	turns	out	to	be	something	that	any	average	Joe	can	do.”).	73.	 See	Cassara,	supra	note	63,	at	16;	see	also	Money	Laundering	&	Terrorist	Financing,	
supra	note	71,	at	14	(noting	how	shell	companies	represent	a	significant	challenge	when	seeking	to	determine	a	beneficial	owner).	74.	 See	Martinez,	supra	note	70,	at	197.	75.		Id.	at	201	n.78.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1401	personally, 76 	and	 those	 that	 do	 will	 often	 incorporate	 their	companies	even	if	the	owner’s	motives	appear	suspicious.77	The	new	beneficial	ownership	requirement,	discussed	in	Part	II.A.2,	that	requires	banks	to	identify	beneficial	owners	of	entities78	is	one	way	the	United	States	has	adapted	to	address	these	issues,	but	 these	 regulations	 have	 been	 criticized	 as	 ineffective.	 John	Cassara,	 a	 former	 US	 Intelligence	 Officer	 and	 Treasury	 Special	Agent, 79 	argues	 that	 the	 regulation’s	 definition	 of	 a	 beneficial	owner	 does	 not	 comport	 with	 the	 internationally	 recognized	definition	and	has	multiple	loopholes.80	The	beneficial	ownership	requirement	mandates	that	a	bank	identify	any	shareholder	with	a	twenty-five	percent	or	greater	interest	in	a	corporation	that	banks	with	 them,81	but	 Cassara	 notes	 that	 if	 no	 one	 person	 owns	 that	twenty-five	 percent	 threshold	 of	 the	 corporation,	 then	 the	 bank	need	not	identify	any	shareholders	at	all.82	Further,	Cassara	notes	that	alternatives,	such	as	listing	a	senior	manager	or	trustee	as	the	beneficial	owner,	do	not	serve	 the	correct	purpose	because	 they	are	 not	 the	 true	 owner	 of	 a	 corporation’s	 or	 trust’s	 assets. 83	Additionally,	 banks	 do	 not	 need	 to	 incorporate	 the	 beneficial	ownership	 information	 into	 their	 records	 or	 keep	 copies	 of	 the	verification	information,	and	the	bank	can	rely	on	the	information	provided	 by	 the	 filer,	 even	 though	 the	 form	 is	 not	 filed	 under	penalty	of	perjury.84	2.	The	Regulations	are	Expensive	Some	of	the	most	significant	problems	with	current	US	AML	regulations	 are	 the	 expense	 of	 maintaining	 compliance	 and	 the	
 76.		Id.	at	202.	77.	 Id.	at	203.	78.	 See	supra	Part	II.A.2.	79.	 Cassara,	supra	note	63,	at	27.	80.	 Id.	at	22.	81.	 See	supra	Part	II.A.2.	82.	 Cassara,	supra	note	63,	at	22.	83.	 Id.	84.	 Id.	(noting	that	the	form	only	requires	that	the	individual	provide	information	“to	the	best	of	their	knowledge”);	see	also	Customer	Due	Diligence	Requirements	for	Financial	Institutions,	81	Fed.	Reg.	29397,	29405	(July	11,	2016)	(“Some	commenters	urged	FinCEN	to	make	the	Certification	Form	an	official	U.S.	Government	document,	with	the	certification	made	under	the	penalty	of	perjury	(rather	than	only	to	the	best	of	the	knowledge	of	the	certifying	party).”).	
1402	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	costs	of	penalties	that	can	be	imposed	on	institutions.85	Both	costs	are	particularly	burdensome	for	smaller	institutions.86	These	costs	are	exacerbated	by	the	ambiguity	of	the	regulations,	which	creates	uncertainty	for	financial	institutions.87		To	reduce	costs,	banks	will	drop	customers	they	determine	to	be	riskier,	a	process	known	as	“de-risking.”88	a.	The	Compliance	Costs	are	Significant	To	 comply	 with	 the	 BSA,	 financial	 firms	 collectively	 spend	about	 US$25.3	 billion	 per	 year 89 	and	 studies	 have	 found	 that	“[b]anks	pay	more	 to	 comply	with	money-laundering	 rules	 than	any	 other	 regulations.”90	These	 compliance	 costs	 are	 even	more	significant	for	smaller	institutions	that	do	not	have	the	economies	of	 scale	 to	meet	 these	 requirements	 and	 keep	 costs	 down.91	An	increasing	number	of	smaller	institutions	have	responded	to	these	costs	 by	 consolidating,	 thereby	 reducing	 the	 number	 of	 smaller	banks	in	the	United	States.92	Part	of	the	problem	is	the	amount	of	time	banks	must	spend	filling	out	CTRs	and	SARs.	It	is	estimated	that	financial	institutions,	on	average,	devote	sixty	minutes	to	each	CTR	filed,93	which	means	that	 financial	 institutions	 collectively	 spent	 approximately	 14.8	million	 hours	 filling	 out	 CTRs	 in	 2011	 and	 14	 million	 hours	 in	
 85.	 See	infra	Part	II.B.2.a,	II.B.2.b.	86.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	notes	97–102,	114–15.	87.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	notes	118–21.	88.	 See	infra	Part	II.B.2.c.	89.	 Anti-Money	Laundering	compliance	costs	U.S.	financial	services	firms	$25.3	billion	
per	year,	according	to	LexisNexis	Risk	Solutions,	LEXISNEXIS	RISK	SOLUTIONS	(Oct.	10,	2018),	https://risk.lexisnexis.com/about-us/press-room/press-release/20181010-true-cost-aml	 [perma.cc/U8QA-V24N];	 see	 also	 A	 New	 Paradigm:	 Redesigning	 the	 U.S.	 AML/CFT	
Framework	to	Protect	National	Security	and	Aid	Law	Enforcement,	CLEARING	HOUSE	3	(Feb.	2017),	https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/TCH/Documents/TCH%20WEEKLY/2017/20170216_TCH_Report_AML_CFT_Framework_Redesign.pdf	[perma.cc/PUW7-2GWP]	.	90 .	 See	 Todd	 Davenport,	 Laundering	 Rules	 Top	 Compliance	 Expenses	 Survey,	 AM.	BANKER,	Jun.	23,	2003,	at	23.	91.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	note	104.	92.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	note	103.	93.	 Robert	G.	Rowe,	III,	Comment	Letter	on	Currency	Transaction	Report,	FinCEN	Form	
104,	 AM.	 BANKERS	 ASS’N	 (DEC.	 1,	 2009),	https://www.aba.com/archive/Comment_Letter_Archive/Comment%20Letter%20Archive/fincen-pra-12109.pdf	[perma.cc/P3LA-G6RN].	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1403	2010.94	For	SARs,	FinCEN	estimates	the	average	reporting	burden	as	two	hours	per	SAR,	or	a	total	of	4,696,790	hours	per	year.95	In	addition,	 financial	 institutions	 incur	 significant	 expenses	 to	 hire	and	 train	 employees	 on	 BSA	 compliance,	 to	 purchase	 account-monitoring	software,	to	implement	adequate	internal	controls,	and	to	conduct	independent	compliance	testing.96	These	 costs	 are	more	 significant	 for	 smaller	 banks,97	which	are	hit	hardest	by	AML	compliance	costs	relative	to	their	bottom	lines.98	This	 is	due	 to	certain	overhead	 investment	requirements	for	AML	programs	that	exist	regardless	of	scale.99	Additionally,	an	American	Banking	Association	2012	survey	found	that	mid-sized	banks,	banks	with	US$1-US$9	billion	in	assets,	“have	an	average	of	four	 full-time	 compliance	 employees	 dedicated	 to	 BSA/AML	functions,”	which	is	beyond	the	staffing	capacity	of	many	smaller	banks. 100 	There	 is	 also	 the	 burden	 of	 finding	 BSA	 compliance	employees,	as	small	banks	can	have	a	difficult	time	hiring	for	these	positions	 due	 to	 stiff	 competition	 from	 larger	 banks	 and	 the	difficulty	 in	 finding	 experts	 knowledgeable	 in	 fields	 like	cybersecurity.101	These	costs	of	finding	and	hiring	more	staff	and	paying	 consultants	 to	 address	BSA/AML	 compliance	have	 led	 to	earnings	losses	and	foregone	dividends.102	
 94.	 See	ANNUAL	REPORT:	FISCAL	YEAR	2011,	FINCEN	7	(2011)	(“about	14.8	million	CTRs	were	filed	in	fiscal	year	2011,	compared	with	about	14	million	in	fiscal	year	2010.”).	Given	the	American	Banker’s	Association’s	estimate	of	60	minutes	of	time	expended	per	CTR	on	average,	see	text	accompanying	supra	note	93.	95.	 See	Proposed	Collection;	Comment	Request;	Update	and	Revision	of	the	FinCEN	Suspicious	Activity	Reports	Electronic	Data	Fields,	 82	Fed.	Reg.	 9109,	 9110-11	 (Feb.	 2,	2017).	96 .	 See	 Levy,	 supra	 note	 28,	 at	 13-5;	 see	 also	 supra	 Part	 II.A.1	 (discussing	 the	compliance	requirements	for	financial	institutions).	97.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	notes	97–102.	98.	 LEXISNEXIS	RISK	SOLUTIONS,	supra	note	89	(calculating	that	the	cost	of	compliance	for	smaller	firms	up	to	.83%	of	total	assets,	but	only	.08%	for	larger	firms).	99.	 Id.	100.	 Daniel	 S.	 Alter,	How	 to	 Lighten	Community	Banks’	 AML	Compliance	 Load,	 AM.	BANKER,	May	1,	2015.	101.	 Id.	(“[T]he	market	is	short	on	qualified	personnel	to	satisfy	expanding	BSA	and	AML	demands.”);	see	also	Bill	Stoneman,	New	Regulatory	Problem:	Filling	Compliance	Jobs,	AM.	BANKER,	Mar.	1,	2005,	at	12	(noting	that	small	banks	have	difficulty	finding	compliance	officers).	102.	 See,	e.g.,	 John	Reosti,	BSA	Staff	Goes	from	3	to	22	at	One	Community	Bank,	AM.	BANKER,	Jan.	2017,	at	4	(detailing	how	Carter	Bank	in	Virginia’s	BSA/AML	compliance	costs,	such	as	increasing	the	number	of	employees	in	its	BSA	department	from	3	to	“a	minimum	of	 22,”	 increasing	 board	 oversight	 of	 BSA	 compliance,	 overhauling	 and	 upgrading	 its	
1404	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	The	BSA,	along	with	other	costly	regulations,	has	also	forced	many	small	banks	to	consolidate,	thereby	reducing	the	number	of	small	banks	in	the	United	States.103	In	2015,	the	Harvard	Kennedy	School	of	Government	found	an	increasing	trend	of	consolidation	among	 small	 community	 banks,	 primarily	 driven	 by	 “regulatory	economies	 of	 scale	 [because]	 larger	 banks	 are	 better	 suited	 to	handle	 heightened	 regulatory	 burdens	 than	 are	 smaller	 banks,	causing	the	average	costs	of	community	banks	to	be	higher.”104	The	report	 found	 that	 among	 the	 regulations	 causing	 these	 burdens	were	the	BSA	and	other	AML	regulations.105	The	US	Government	Accountability	 Office	 (the	 “GAO”) 106 	also	 found	 BSA/AML	regulations	 to	 be	 some	 of	 the	 most	 burdensome	 to	 smaller	institutions.107	Representatives	 from	 the	 smaller	 banks	 that	 the	GAO	 examined	 cited	 the	 time	 their	 staff	 spent	 addressing	 the	regulations,	the	costs	of	implementing	system	upgrades	or	hiring	third	party	compliance	specialists,	and	the	costs	of	due-diligence	as	responsible	for	causing	the	burdens	placed	on	smaller	banks.108	
 training	and	retaining	an	outside	firm	to	conduct	a	review,	led	to	forgoing	its	fourth	quarter	2016	dividend	and	how	CU	Bancorp	expected	annual	expenses	to	rise	by	about	$3	million	due	to	BSA	compliance);	see	also	Allison	Prang,	BSA	compliance	costs	take	toll	on	Investors	
Bancorp	earnings,	AM.	BANKER,	 Jul.	31,	2017	 (describing	how	 Investor	Bancorp	 in	Short	Hills,	N.J.	blamed	a	drop	in	Q2	2017	quarterly	earnings	on	the	costs	of	addressing	BSA/AML	compliance).	103 .	 See	 Leslie	 Picker	 &	 Matthew	 Monks,	 Small	 Banks	 Feel	 the	 Urge	 to	 Merge,	BLOOMBERG	BUS.	WEEK,	Oct.	7,	2013,	at	49-52.	104.	 See	Marshall	Lux	&	Robert	Greene,	The	State	and	Fate	of	Community	Banking	21	(Harvard	Kennedy	Sch.,	Working	Paper	No.	37,	2015);	see	also	Stoneman,	supra	note	101,	at	12	(“[T]he	growing	compliance	burden	 is	one	reason	that”	First	Fowler	Bancorp	Inc.	agreed	to	be	sold	 to	Sunflower	Bank);	 James	Wilcox,	Economies	of	Scale	and	Continuing	
Consolidation	of	Credit	Unions,	FRBSF	ECON.	LETTER,	Nov.	4,	2005,	at	1	(finding	that	BSA	costs	 are	 born	 disproportionately	 by	 smaller	 institutions,	 which	 incentivizes	consolidation);	 Laura	 Thompson	 Osuri,	 Small-Bank	 Deal	 Drivers:	 Costs,	 Regulatory	
Pressure,	 AM.	 BANKER,	May	 24,	 2005	 (“[T]he	 preponderance	 of	 small,	 underperforming	banks	reflects	merger	trends,	growing	pains,	and	a	heavier	regulatory	burden.”).	105 .	 See	 Lux	 &	 Greene,	 supra	 note	 104;	 see	 also	 Alter,	 supra	 note	 100	 (“[T]he	American	 Banking	 Association	 has	 identified	 BSA	 and	 AML	 requirements	 as	 ‘the	most	costly	regulatory	burden.’”).	106.	 The	GAO	 is	 an	agency	 that	 examines	how	 tax	dollars	 are	 spent	 and	provides	government	agencies	with	reports	and	testimonies	to	help	them	work	more	efficiently.	See	
Overview,	 U.S.	 GOV’T	 ACCOUNTABILITY	 OFFICE,	 https://www.gao.gov/about/	[perma.cc/EA3V-F2HK]	(last	visited	Apr.	14,	2020).	107 .	 See	 U.S.	 GOV’T	 ACCOUNTABILITY	 OFFICE,	 COMMUNITY	 BANKS	 AND	 CREDIT	 UNIONS:	REGULATORS	COULD	TAKE	ADDITIONAL	STEPS	TO	ADDRESS	COMPLIANCE	BURDENS	51	(2018);	see	
also	John	Reich,	Tackling	the	Burden,	COMMUNITY	BANKER,	Sept.	2005,	at	38.	108.	 See	U.S.	GOV’T	ACCOUNTABILITY	OFFICE,	supra	note	107,	at	18-20.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1405	b.	Penalties	are	also	a	Significant	Cost	to	Financial	Institutions	The	 cost	 of	 penalties	 imposed	 on	 banks	 for	 compliance	deficiencies	 is	 also	 significant. 109 	Banks	 that	 violate	 certain	provisions	of	the	BSA	can	face	“criminal	money	penalties	up	to	the	greater	of	$1	million	or	 twice	 the	value	of	 the	 transaction.”110	In	fact,	 Regulators	 assessed	 US$5.2	 billion	 in	 fines,	 penalties,	 and	forfeitures	 for	 violations	 of	 BSA/AML	 regulations	 from	 2009	 to	2016.111	Further,	trends	appear	to	indicate	that	the	frequency	and	size	of	these	penalties	will	rise	in	the	future.112	Each	 individual	 penalty	 can	 also	 be	 significant,	 with	 some	penalties	 in	 excess	 of	 US$1	 billion.113	Even	 smaller	 fines	 can	 be	significant,	for	example,	a	fine	imposed	against	the	Bank	of	Mingo	of	Williamson,	West	Virginia	of	only	US$4.5	million114	amounted	to	
 109.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	notes	110-12.	110.	 31	U.S.C.	§	5322(d)	(2018);	see	also	FED.	FIN.	INST.	EXAMINATION	COUNCIL,	supra	note	29,	at	9.	111.	 Reosti,	supra	note	102,	at	4;	see	also,	FINANCIAL	INSTITUTIONS:	FINES,	PENALTIES,	AND	 FORFEITURES	 FOR	 VIOLATIONS	 OF	 FINANCIAL	 CRIMES	 AND	 SANCTIONS	 REQUIREMENTS,	 U.S.	GOV’T	ACCOUNTABILITY	OFFICE	11	(2016).	112.	 See	Sharon	Brown-Hruska,	Developments	 in	Bank	Secrecy	Act	and	Anti-Money	
Laundering	 Enforcement	 and	 Litigation	 7-8	 (2016),	https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/PUB_Developments_BSA_AML_Lit-06.16.pdf	[perma.cc/HA2F-D3C7];	see	also	Sullivan	&	Cromwell	LLP,	2015	Year-
End	Review	of	BSA/AML	and	 Sanctions	Developments	 and	Their	 Importance	 to	 Financial	
Institutions	 2	 (2016),	https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2015_Year_End_Review_of_BSA_AML_3_3_16.pdf	[perma.cc/NHD6-BHPK]	(“In	 2015,	we	 continued	 to	 see	 record-setting	 fines	.	.	.	 against	 financial	 institutions	 for	violations	of	BSA/AML	.	.	.	laws.”).	113.	 See,	e.g.,	Press	Release,	FinCEN,	JPMorgan	Admits	Violation	of	the	Bank	Secrecy	Act	 for	 Failed	 Madoff	 Oversight;	 Fined	 $461	 Million	 by	 FinCEN	 (Jan.	 7,	 2014),	https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/jpmorgan-admits-violation-bank-secrecy-act-failed-madoff-oversight-fined-461	 [perma.cc/FC7X-Q3QW]	 (fining	 JP	 Morgan	 $2.05	billion	for	violating	the	BSA	by	failing	to	report	suspicious	transactions	arising	from	the	Bernie	Madoff	Scandal);	see	also	Press	Release,	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Justice,	HSBC	Holdings	Plc.	and	HSBC	Bank	USA	N.A.	Admit	 to	Anti-Money	Laundering	and	Sanctions	Violations,	Forfeit	$1.256	 Billion	 in	 Deferred	 Prosecution	 Agreement	 (Dec.	 11,	 2012),	https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations	[perma.cc/R5CQ-ZNWQ]	(fining	HSBC	about	$1.9	billion	for	violations	of	the	BSA,	the	International	Emergency	Economic	Powers	Act,	and	the	Trading	with	the	Enemy	Act).	114.	 Press	Release,	FinCEN,	FinCEN	Penalizes	W.	Va.	Bank	for	Serious	BSA	Violations	and	 Actions	 by	 a	 Branch	 Manager	 That	 Assisted	 Criminal	 Activity	 (Jun.	 15,	 2015),	https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-penalizes-west-virginia-bank-serious-bsa-violations-and-actions-branch	[perma.cc/58CF-XAVV].	
1406	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	about	seventy-three	percent	of	its	equity	capital.115	In	addition	to	monetary	 penalties,	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 will	 also	 impose	costly	 independent	monitors	 on	 non-compliant	 banks	 to	 ensure	BSA	compliance.116	In	an	extreme	case,	Riggs	Bank	in	Washington,	D.C.	faced	such	intense	scrutiny	from	regulators	that	it	was	forced	to	shut	down	its	more	scrutinized	business	with	embassies,	and	the	bank	was	shut	down	and	sold	to	PNC	Bank.117	Further	exacerbating	the	costs	of	penalties,	examiners	take	a	highly	 subjective	 approach	 in	 determining	 whether	 a	 bank	 has	complied	 with	 AML	 regulations.118 	Financial	 institution	 officials	may	 reasonably	 disagree	with	 regulators	 on	 the	 risks	 posed	 by	certain	 customers	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 financial	 institutions	must	 go	 to	 verify	 a	 customer’s	 identity. 119 	Yet,	 regulators	 may	sanction	financial	 institutions	whose	officials	believed	they	were	taking	reasonable	steps	in	a	risk-based	approach.120	For	example,	in	 a	 GAO	 report,	 one	 financial	 institution	 reported	 that	 a	 BSA	examiner	questioned	the	way	the	financial	 institution	was	rating	the	 risk	 of	 two	 countries	 on	 the	 firm’s	 risk	matrix,	 but	 “did	 not	provide	 a	 basis	 for	 believing	 that	 certain	 countries	 should	 be	higher	on	the	firm’s	risk	ranking.”121	c.	AML	Regulations	lead	to	Financial	Institution	De-Risking	Another	 cost	 imposed	 by	 the	 BSA	 is	 that	 some	 financial	institutions	pursue	a	policy	of	de-risking,	which	is	the	termination	of	 product	 lines	 or	 relationships	 with	 categories	 of	 high-risk	
 115.	 See	Brown-Hruska,	supra	note	112,	at	8.	116.	 See	Deferred	Prosecution	Agreement,	United	States	v.	HSBC	Bank	USA	N.A.,	No.	1:12-cr-763,	 15-17	 (E.D.N.Y.	 Dec.	 11,	 2012),	https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/12/11/dpa-executed.pdf	[perma.cc/W2KB-UP7A]	(imposing	a	5-year	monitorship	on	HSBC	as	part	of	its	deferred	prosecution	agreement).	117.	 See	Associated	Press,	PNC	agrees	to	buy	troubled	Riggs	bank,	NBC	NEWS	(Jul.	16,	2004,	 2:01	 PM),	 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5451203/ns/business-us_business/t/pnc-agrees-buy-troubled-riggs-bank/	 [perma.cc/ZY96-9MLW];	 see	 also	Paul	S.	Pilecki	&	Michael	A.	Mancusi,	Riggs	Order	Articulates	Bank	Secrecy	Act	Compliance	
Requirements,	J.	OF	INV.	COMPLIANCE,	2004,	at	85;	Riggs	Bank	Fined	$25	Million,	TELLERVISION,	2004,	at	3.	118.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	notes	119-21.	119 .	 USA	 PATRIOT	 ACT:	 ADDITIONAL	 GUIDANCE	 COULD	 IMPROVE	 IMPLEMENTATION	 OF	REGULATIONS	RELATED	TO	CUSTOMER	IDENTIFICATION	AND	INFORMATION	SHARING	PROCEDURES,	U.S.	GOV’T	ACCOUNTABILITY	OFFICE	23-24	(2005).	120.	 Id.	121.	 Id.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1407	customers	 to	 reduce	 AML	 risk, 122 	as	 a	 response	 to	 increased	regulatory	scrutiny.123	If	a	bank	cannot	determine	if	a	transaction	is	 legitimate,	 it	may	err	on	 the	side	of	caution124	and	opt	 to	stop	working	with	businesses	that	draw	scrutiny.125	This	can	result	in	mass	 customer	 exit	 programs	 where	 banks	 terminate	 existing	relationships	 and	 cut	 ties	 with	whole	 sectors	 or	 client	 types,126	such	 as	 embassies,	 money	 service	 businesses,	 and	 foreign	correspondent	banks	due	to	the	higher	risk	of	money	laundering	they	present.127	Many	smaller	banks	have	also	restricted	access	to	international	 customers 128 	and	 have	 scaled	 back	 their	international	 remittance	 businesses	 due	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 assisting	money	transfers	 in	higher-risk	countries.129	One	of	 the	pitfalls	of	de-risking	however,	is	that	as	large	banks	leave	higher	risk	areas	customers	will	migrate	to	smaller	institutions	that	lack	resources	and	expertise	to	manage	the	risk	and	who	are	pressed	for	sources	of	revenue.130	Further,	de-risking	inhibits	charities	from	servicing	
 122.	 See	Bukola	Adisa,	AML	De-Risking:	An	effective	method	of	plugging	AML	control	
failures?	 Association	 of	 Certified	 Anti-Money	 Laundering	 Specialists	 3	 (2014),	 AML	 De-Risking:	An	 effective	method	of	 plugging	AML	 control	 failures?	Association	 of	 Certified	Anti-Money	Laundering	Specialists.	123.	 Id.	at	4	(noting	that	many	financial	institutions	de-risk	to	plug	deficiencies	due	to	the	increased	costs	of	penalties	and	fines);	see	also	supra	Part	II.B.2	(detailing	the	costs	of	AML	compliance	and	failure	to	financial	institutions).	124.	 Alan	Kline,	Small	Banks	Suffering	Too	in	 ‘Derisking’	Push,	AM.	BANKER,	Dec.	26,	2014.	125.	 Id.	126.	 Adisa,	supra	note	122.	127.	 Id.;	see	also	Kline,	supra	note	124	(noting	some	banks	“might	not	be	comfortable	banking	casinos,	marijuana	dispensaries,	payday	lenders	or	others	that	could	be	perceived	as	 fronts	 for	money	 laundering.”);	 U.S.	 GOV’T	ACCOUNTABILITY	OFFICE,	 BANK	 SECRECY	ACT:	DERISKING	 ALONG	 THE	 SOUTHWEST	 BORDER	 HIGHLIGHTS	 NEED	 FOR	 REGULATORS	 TO	 ENHANCE	RETROSPECTIVE	REVIEWS	18-19	(2018)	(noting	de-risking	as	a	factor	responsible	for	account	terminations	and	branch	closures	in	the	southwest	border	region).	128.	 See	Laura	Thompson	Osuri,	Small	Banks	 in	Fla.	Lash	Out	on	BSA,	AM.	BANKER,	Sept.	2,	2005,	at	1.	129.	 See	Andy	Peters,	Too	Hot	to	Handle,	AM.	BANKER,	Apr.	2015,	at	10.	These	higher	risk	geographic	areas	can	include	countries	identified	as	sponsoring	terrorism,	countries	with	weak	AML	regulatory	regimes	of	their	own,	or	areas	in	the	United	States	known	to	have	a	high	degree	of	drug	trafficking.	See	FED.	FIN.	INST.	EXAMINATION	COUNCIL,	supra	note	29,	at	21-22.	130.	 See	 Adisa,	 supra	 note	 122,	 at	 16;	 see	 also	 Tracy	 Durner	 &	 Liat	 Shetret,	
Understanding	De-Risking	and	its	Effects	on	Financial	Inclusion,	GLOB.	CTR	ON	COOP.	SEC.	19	(2015),	 https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rr-bank-de-risking-181115-en.pdf	 [perma.cc/46Y7-JVTV]	(“As	a	result,	 those	riskier	businesses	are	becoming	customers	of	smaller	banks.	This	is	cause	for	concern,	since	smaller	institutions	are	less	likely	to	have	the	stringent	controls	that	their	larger	competitors	have	in	place.”).	
1408	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	higher	 risk	 international	 regions	 that	 are	 poor	 or	 facing	humanitarian	crises,	which	can	exacerbate	those	problems.131	
C.	Lawyer’s	Roles	in	Regulating	AML	Unlike	financial	institutions,	American	lawyers	currently	self-regulate	the	enforcement	of	AML	risks.	Their	regulations	are	more	patchwork	 than	 financial	 institution	 AML	 regulations.	 Lawyers	regulate	AML	risks	through	ethical	requirements,	existing	criminal	statutes,	 education	 efforts,	 and	 the	 ABA’s	 “Voluntary	 Good	Guidance	for	Lawyers”	(the	“Voluntary	Guidance”).	1.	Professional	Ethics	Requirements	and	Criminal	Statutes	While	 American	 lawyers	 are	 not	 obligated	 to	 comply	 with	BSA/AML	regulations,	they	are	still	first	and	foremost	governed	by	existing	money	 laundering	statutes.132	Attorneys	who	participate	in	 the	 laundering	 of	 illicit	 funds	 for	 their	 clients	 can	 be	 held	criminally	liable	for	money	laundering133	and	can	have	their	legal	fees	 subject	 to	 forfeiture. 134 	Attorneys	 also	 cannot	 shield	themselves	 from	 liability	 through	 “willful	 ignorance”	 of	 their	client’s	bad	deeds.135	Additionally,	state	ethical	requirements	mandate	that	lawyers	not	assist	their	clients	in	conduct	the	attorney	knows	to	be	criminal	
 131.	 See	Durner	&	Shetret,	supra	note	130,	at	20-21.	132.	 Lawton	P.	Cummings	&	Paul	T.	Stepnowsky,	My	Brother’s	Keeper:	An	Empirical	
Study	of	Attorney	Facilitation	of	Money	Laundering	through	Commercial	Transactions,	2011	J.	PROF.	L.	1,	14	(2011).	133.	 See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	King,	865	F.3d	848	(6th	Cir.	2017)	(upholding	a	money	laundering	conviction	of	an	attorney	who	offered	to	launder	funds).	134.	 Cummings	&	 Stepnowsky,	 supra	note	132,	 at	 18;	 see	 also	 Caplin	&	Drysdale,	Chartered	v.	United	States,	491	U.S.	617,	626	(1989)	(“[N]o	lawyer,	in	any	case,	.	.	.	has	the	right	to	.	.	.	accept	stolen	property,	or	.	.	.	in	payment	of	a	fee.	.	.	.	The	privilege	to	practice	law	is	not	a	 license	to	steal.”)	(citing	Laska	v.	United	States,	82	F.2d	672,	677	(10th	Cir.	1936)).	135.	 See	 Glob.-Tech	 Appliances,	 Inc.	 v.	 SEB	 S.A.,	 563	 U.S.	 754,	 755-56	 (2011)	(describing	 the	concept	of	 “willful	blindness,”	noting	 that	defendants	who	 “subjectively	believe	that	there	is	a	high	probability	that	a	fact	exists”	and	who	“take	deliberate	actions	to	avoid	learning	of	that	fact”	can	be	found	to	have	acted	“knowingly	or	willfully.”);	see	also	United	States	v.	Flores,	454	F.3d	149,	154-55	(3d.	Cir.	2006)	(an	attorney	was	criminally	convicted	of	money	laundering	based	on	a	theory	of	“willful	blindness”	because	he	ignored	numerous	 red	 flags	 including	 the	 client	 using	 false	 social	 security	 numbers,	 the	 large	amount	of	transactions	without	apparent	commercial	justification,	and	inquiries	from	the	lawyer’s	accountant	as	to	the	suspicious	nature	of	the	transactions).	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1409	or	 fraudulent136	and	withdraw	 from	 the	 representation	 if	 it	will	result	in	the	violation	of	the	rules	of	professional	conduct	or	other	laws.137	A	lawyer	“may”	also	withdraw	from	representation	if	the	client	 uses	 the	 lawyer	 for	 services	 that	 the	 lawyer	 reasonably	believes	to	be	criminal	or	fraudulent	or	if	“the	client	has	used	the	lawyer’s	 services	 to	 perpetrate	 a	 crime	 or	 fraud.” 138 	Further,	 a	lawyer	may	reveal	information	relating	to	a	representation	to	the	extent	the	lawyer	reasonably	believes	necessary	to	prevent	a	crime	or	fraud	or	prevent,	mitigate	or	rectify	financial	harm	to	another	that	resulted	from	a	client’s	crime	or	fraud.139	However,	 a	 lawyer	 is	 not	 mandated	 to	 withdraw	 from	representation	unless	the	lawyer	has	actual	knowledge	that	his	or	her	 client	 committed	 a	 crime	 or	 fraud	 and	 the	 lawyer	 is	 not	required	 to	 disclose	 any	 information	 related	 to	 that	 fraud	 or	crime.140	Therefore,	a	lawyer	may	continue	to	“ethically”	represent	a	client	he	or	she	reasonably	believes	to	be	committing	a	crime	and	it	 is	 not	 required	 by	 ABA	 regulations	 to	 disclose	 the	 client’s	wrongdoing	 even	 after	 discovered. 141 	The	 ABA	 has,	 however,	issued	 an	 opinion	 that	 lawyers	 are	 in	 compliance	 with	 ethical	requirements	if	they	implement	a	risk-based	approach	to	identify	and	detect	money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing	in	compliance	with	 the	 Voluntary	 Guidance. 142 	Finally,	 lawyers	 are	 already	required	 to	 report	 to	 the	 IRS	 the	 receipt	 of	 currency	 “over	[US]$10,000,	on	reports	(IRS	Form	8300)	that	require	the	lawyer	to	disclose	the	source	of	the	payment	and	whether	that	source	is	a	client.”143	
 136.	 MODEL	RULES	OF	PROF’L	CONDUCT	r.	1.2(d)	(AM.	BAR	ASS’N	1983);	see	also	Gregory,	
supra	note	3,	at	43.	137.	 MODEL	RULES	OF	PROF’L	CONDUCT	r.	1.16(a)(1)	(AM.	BAR	ASS’N	1983).	138.	 Id.	r.	1.16(b)(2)-(3).	139.	 Id.	r.	1.6(b)(2)-(3).	140.	 Id.	r.	1.6(b)(2)-(3),	1.16(b)(2)-(3)	(noting	that	both	rules	use	the	word	“may,”	not	“must”	or	“shall”).	141.	 See	id.	r.	1.6(b)(2)-(3),	1.16(b)(2)-(3).	142.	 ABA	Comm’n	on	Ethics	and	Prof’l	Responsibility,	Formal	Op.	463	 (2013);	 see	
also	infra	Part	II.C.3	(providing	details	on	the	“Voluntary	Good	Guidance	for	Lawyers”).	143.	 A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	the	Prof.,	Comments	of	the	ABA	Task	
Force	 on	 Gatekeeper	 Regulations	 and	 the	 Profession	 on	 the	 Financial	 Action	 Task	 Force	
Consultation	 Paper	 dated	 May	 30,	 2002,	 A.B.A.	 9	 (2002),	https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/krauland.pdf	 [perma.cc/X6ZS-NFLF];	see	also	26	U.S.C.	§	6050-I	(2018).	
1410	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	2.	Education	Programs	The	ABA	also	works	to	educate	practicing	attorneys	on	money	laundering,	 terrorist	 financing,	 and	 how	 attorneys	 can	 avoid	unwittingly	assisting	in	these	activities.144	The	educational	efforts	have	included	“the	development	of	policy	statements,	continuing	legal	education	(CLE)	sessions,	articles,	casebook	discussions,	and	state	bar	web	page	articles	or	links.”145	These	efforts	have	largely	targeted	attorneys	who	work	in	the	fields	identified	by	the	FATF’s	recommendations	as	involving	activities	that	should	be	subject	to	AML	 requirements146	including,	 lawyers	 who	 handle	 real	 estate	matters,	 trusts	and	estates,	 international	practice,	and	corporate	formation	 and	 management. 147 	There	 have	 also	 been	 efforts	 to	educate	 ethics	 experts	 who	 provide	 advice	 regarding	 risk	management	and	rule	compliance,	such	as	general	counsel	in	law	firms	and	legal	ethics	academics.148	Additionally,	the	ABA	has	worked	to	promote	the	Voluntary	Guidance,149	which	was	created	by	the	ABA	to	educate	American	attorneys	 on	money	 laundering	 and	 terrorist	 financing	 to	 assist	them	 in	 “designing	 and	 implementing	 effective	 risk-based	approaches.”150	These	efforts	have	included	putting	the	Voluntary	
 144.	 See	Laurel	S.	Terry,	U.S.	Legal	Profession	Efforts	to	Combat	Money	Laundering	&	
Terrorist	Financing,	59	N.Y.	L.	SCH.	L.	REV.	487,	502	(2015);	see	also	Int’l	Bar	Ass’n	et	al.,	A	
Lawyer’s	 Guide	 to	 Detecting	 and	 Preventing	 Money	 Laundering,	 A.B.A.	 2	 (Oct.	 2014),	https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguide_preventingmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf	 [perma.cc/3CKS-VL5L]	(“This	Guide	 is	intended	as	a	resource	to	be	used	by	lawyers	and	law	firms	to	highlight	the	ethical	and	professional	concerns	relating	to	AML	and	to	help	lawyers	and	law	firms	comply	with	their	legal	obligations	 in	 countries	where	 they	apply.”);	 see	also	Gregory,	 supra	 note	3,	 at	43	(describing	 efforts	 the	 ABA	 has	 made	 to	 develop	 education	 programs	 for	 lawyers	 on	money	 laundering	 risks	 and	 “help	 lawyers	 render	 legal	 services	 in	 accordance	 with	practices	 intended	 to	 deter	 actual	 money	 launderers	 and	 terrorist	 financiers	 from	engaging	the	legal	profession.”).	145.	 See	Terry,	supra	note	144,	at	503.	146.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	7,	¶	22(d).	147.	 See	Terry,	supra	note	144,	at	504-05.	148.	 See	id.	at	505.	149 .	 See	 infra	 Part	 II.C.3	 (providing	 details	 on	 the	 “Voluntary	 Good	 Guidance	 for	Lawyers”).	150.	 See	A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	the	Prof.,	Voluntary	Good	Practices	
Guidance	 for	 Lawyers	 to	Detect	 and	 Combat	Money	 Laundering	 and	Terrorist	 Financing,	A.B.A.	 2	 -	 3	 (2010),	https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_taskforce_gtfgoodpracticesguidance.authcheckdam.pdf	[perma.cc/SQS4-QGGL].	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1411	Guidance	in	CLE	sessions,	placing	the	guidance	on	bar	association	websites,	publishing	stories	in	the	ABA	Journal,	and	encouraging	professional	responsibility	academics	to	teach	the	guidance	to	law	students.151	The	hope	 is	 that,	while	 it	 is	unlikely	education	alone	can	stop	lawyers	from	intentionally	committing	or	assisting	money	laundering, 152 	the	 educational	 resources	 provided	 can	 help	lawyers	avoid	unwittingly	assisting	clients	in	money	laundering.153	3.	Voluntary	Good	Guidance	for	Lawyers	The	Voluntary	Guidance	was	adopted	by	the	ABA	in	2010	and	supported	 by	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Treasury, 154 	partially	 in	response	 to	 anticipation	 that	 the	 legal	 profession	 might	 face	mandatory	 federal	 regulation	 in	 this	 area	 due	 to	 international	pressure	 from	 the	 FATF.155	The	Voluntary	Guidance	 is	 a	manual	intended	to	educate	lawyers	on	assessing	the	risk	that	a	client	may	be	laundering	funds	with	the	lawyer’s	assistance.156	The	Voluntary	Guidance	is	modeled	after	the	FATF’s	Lawyer’s	Guidance,	targeting	the	 same	 types	 of	 lawyers	 and	 recommending	 the	 same	 AML	approach.157	However,	 unlike	 the	 Lawyer’s	 Guidance, 158 	the	 Voluntary	Guidance	is	not	a	mandatory	regulatory	requirement	and	is	only	meant	as	a	voluntary	educational	tool	to	help	lawyers	address	their	own	risks	of	unwittingly	assisting	money	 laundering	or	 terrorist	financing. 159 	If	 a	 lawyer	 determines	 that	 a	 client	 presents	 an	unacceptable	risk,	the	Voluntary	Guidance	only	recommends	that	the	 lawyer	 comply	 with	 ethics	 requirements	 and	 terminate	 the	
 151.	 See	Terry,	supra	note	144,	at	508.	152.	 See	 id.	 at	502	(“If	 the	vast	network	of	 federal	 criminal	 laws	and	enforcement	mechanisms	are	insufficient	to	deter	intentional	criminal	acts	by	lawyers,	it	is	unlikely	that	any	additional	efforts	by	the	profession	would	deter	such	conduct.”).	153.	 See	id.	154.	 See	A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	the	Prof.,	supra	note	150,	at	iii.	155.	 See	id.	at	2-3;	see	also	Terry,	supra	note	144,	at	508.	156.	 Cummings,	supra	note	132,	at	20.	157.	 Compare	A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	 the	Prof.,	supra	note	150,	
with	 Fin.	 Action	 Task	 Force,	 RBA	 Guidance	 for	 Legal	 Professionals	 15	 (2008),	https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20professions.pdf	[perma.cc/4TVF-E63F].	158.	 See	generally	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157.	159.	 See	A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	the	Prof.,	supra	note	150,	at	3.	
1412	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	representation.160	There	 is	no	penalty	 in	 the	Voluntary	Guidance	that	 would	 apply	 to	 lawyers	 who	 do	 not	 adopt	 the	 risk-based	approach.161	Further,	while	the	FATF	does	not	mandate	suspicious	activity	 reporting,	 it	encourages	 individual	 jurisdictions	 to	apply	their	 own	 suspicious	 activity	 reporting	 rules. 162 	The	 Voluntary	Guidance	 conversely	 does	 not	 recommend	 any	 reporting	requirement.163	There	 are,	 however,	 critics	 who	 note	 that	 the	 Voluntary	Guidance	is	not	sufficient	to	accomplish	its	goal.164	The	guidance	is	voluntary	 and	 there	 are	 no	 consequences	 for	 disregarding	 its	provisions.165	The	 guidance	 is	 also	 not	 actually	 that	well	 known	among	 lawyers,	 meaning	 that	 it	 cannot	 even	 have	 its	 intended	effect	of	educating	lawyers	on	how	to	reduce	risks	of	inadvertently	assisting	 clients	 in	 money	 laundering	 or	 terrorist	 financing. 166	Therefore,	further	action	must	be	taken	for	the	Voluntary	Guidance	to	be	effective.	
III.	THE	UNITED	KINGDOM	APPROACH	TO	REGULATING	
ATTORNEY	MONEY	LAUNDERING	RISKS	Internationally,	one	solution	to	curtail	money	laundering	has	been	to	expand	the	scope	of	AML	regulations	to	encompass	other	industries	 beyond	 traditional	 financial	 institutions. 167 	In	 the	United	 States,	 this	 has	 meant	 expanding	 the	 BSA	 to	 target	additional	 industries	 such	 as	 casinos,	 card	 clubs,	 and	 money	
 160.	 See	id.;	see	also	MODEL	RULES	OF	PROF’L	CONDUCT	r.	1.16(b)(2)-(3)	(AM.	BAR	ASS’N	1983).	161.	 See	A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	the	Prof.,	supra	note	150.	162.	 See	infra	text	accompanying	note	245.	163.	 See	generally	A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	the	Prof.,	supra	note	150.	164 .	 See	 Glob.	 Legal	 Grp.,	 International	 Comparative	 Legal	 Guide	 to:	 Anti-Money	
Laundering,	 GIBSON,	 DUNN	 &	 CRUTCHER	 6	 (2018),	 https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Brooker-and-Cohen-Anti-Money-Laundering-2018-ICGL-2018.pdf	[perma.cc/5H6B-7KJR].	165.	 See	id.	(internal	citation)	(“The	ABA	voluntary	guidance	is	a	joke	because	there	are	no	consequences,	unless	you’re	prosecuted,	and	that	happens	once	every	five	years.”).	166.	 See	id.	(internal	citation)	(“If	you	went	out	and	asked	lawyers,	 ‘Have	you	ever	heard	of	these	voluntary	guidelines?’	99	percent	will	say	they	have	never	heard	of	them.”).	167.	 See	supra	Part	I.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1413	service	 businesses. 168 	Internationally,	 however,	 this	 has	 also	meant	expanding	the	regulations	to	include	lawyers.169	As	 mentioned	 briefly	 above,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 has	expanded	 AML	 regulations	 to	 cover	 attorneys. 170 	The	 United	Kingdom	 first	 extended	 the	 AML	 requirement	 to	 transactional	attorneys	 when	 it	 passed	 the	 POCA	 and	 the	 Money	 Laundering	Regulations	of	2003	in	response	to	a	directive	from	the	European	Commission. 171 	These	 regulations	 first	 required	 transactional	attorneys	 to	 perform	 due	 diligence	 on	 their	 clients	 and	 report	reasonable	 suspicions	 of	 money	 laundering	 to	 the	 National	Criminal	 Intelligence	 Service. 172 	In	 2007,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	furthered	its	AML	regulations	of	the	legal	profession	by	adopting	the	 Regulations	 2007	 to	 implement	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	European	Union’s	Third	Money	Laundering	Directive	and	FATF	40	Recommendations,	 which	 took	 a	 risk-based	 approach	 to	 AML	regulations.173	The	model	for	the	United	Kingdom’s	regulation	of	attorneys	was	 originally	 developed	 by	 the	 FATF,174	an	 inter-governmental	body	established	by	the	G-7	nations,175	responsible	for	setting	and	promoting	international	AML	standards.176	As	part	of	its	mandate,	
 168 .	 See	 generally	 Bank	 Secrecy	 Act,	 31	 C.F.R.	 §	 1020-1030	 (2010)	 (listing	 the	different	types	of	entities	that	FinCEN	regulates).	169.	 See	Glob.	Legal	Grp.,	supra	note	164,	at	2;	see	also	Kevin	L.	Shepherd,	Guardians	
at	 the	 Gate:	 The	 Gatekeeper	 Initiative	 and	 The	 Risk-Based	 Approach	 For	 Transactional	
Lawyers,	43	REAL	PROP.	TR.	&	EST.	L.J.	607,	622	(2009).	170.	 See	FIN.	ACTION	TASK	FORCE,	supra	note	12.	171.	 See	Cummings	&	Stepnowsky,	supra	note	132,	at	15-16;	see	also	John	A.	Terrill	II	&	Michael	A.	Breslow,	The	Role	of	Lawyers	in	Combating	Money	Laundering	and	Terrorist	
Financing:	Lessons	from	the	English	Approach,	59	N.Y.L.	SCH.	L.	REV.	433,	438	(2015).	172.	 Cummings	&	Stepnowsky,	supra	note	132,	at	16.	173.	 See	Terrill	II	&	Breslow,	supra	note	171	at	438;	see	also	The	Money	Laundering	Regulations	 2007,	 Explanatory	Memorandum	¶¶	2.1,	 4.1	 (Eng.).	 The	 European	Union’s	Third	Money	 Laundering	Directive	was	 implemented	 to	 bring	AML	Regulations	 among	European	 Union	 Member	 States	 into	 compliance	 with	 the	 FATF’s	 most	 recent	recommendations.	 See	 Council	 Directive	 2005/60,	 2005	 O.J.	 (L	 309)	 1	 (EC).	 The	 FATF	recommendations	that	further	explained	these	AML	requirements	are	discussed	further	below.	See	infra	Part	III.B.	174.	 See	The	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2007,	Explanatory	Memorandum,	supra	note	173,	¶	7.1.	175.	 See	 Fin.	 Action	 Task	 Force,	 Who	 we	 are,	 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/	[https://perma.cc/K8YU-L6BG]	(last	visited	Apr.	13,	2020);	see	also	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	
History	of	 the	FATF,	https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/	 [perma.cc/RE6Z-Q3AA]	(last	visited	Apr.	14,	2020).	176.	 See	id.	
1414	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	the	FATF	 releases	a	 series	of	 recommendations,	which	 set	out	 a	comprehensive	 framework	 of	 AML	 regulations	 that	 individual	countries	can	and	do	use177	to	create	their	own	AML	frameworks	adapted	for	their	specific	circumstances.178	Beginning	in	2003,	the	FATF	first	began	including	recommendations	that	lawyers,	among	other	non-financial	businesses	and	professionals	 (“DNFBPs”),	be	covered	 under	 AML/CFT	 regulations. 179 	The	 FATF	 noted	 an	“‘increasing	concern’	that	money	laundering	schemes	involve	the	use	 of	 professionals”	 such	 as	 lawyers	 to	 act	 as	 financial	intermediaries	or	provide	expert	advice.180	The	concern	was	that	their	 specialized	 expertise	 allowed	 them	 to	 create	 corporate	vehicles,	 trusts,	 and	 other	 legal	 arrangements	 that	 can	 facilitate	money	 laundering.181	Lawyers	were	also	noted	to	be	 in	a	unique	position	 to	observe	and	 identify	potentially	 suspicious	activities,	but	they	were	subject	to	confidentiality	commitments	that	underlie	the	very	relationships	that	allowed	them	to	perform	these	roles.182	
 177.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	Consolidated	Table	of	Assessment	Ratings,	3	(2020),	https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf	[perma.cc/6M9S-G4P5]	(last	visited	Apr.	14,	2020).	178.	 See	 Fin.	 Action	 Task	 Force,	 The	 FATF	 Recommendations,	 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html	[perma.cc/94EV-PCA5]	(last	visited	Apr.	13,	2020).	179.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force	on	Money	Laundering,	Ann.	Rep.:	2002–2003,	1	(June	20,	 2003),	 https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/2789358.pdf	 [perma.cc/E9MZ-RXW6].	FATF’s	general	movement	to	expand	the	umbrella	of	AML/Terrorist	Financing	regulations	to	other	Designated	Non-Financial	Professional	Businesses	(“DNFPBs”)	includes	not	just	lawyers,	but	also	casinos,	real	estate	agents,	accountants,	notaries,	and	trust	and	company	service	providers.	See,	e.g.,	Ann.	Rep.:	2002–2003,	supra,	at	1;	see	also	Shepherd,	supra	note	169,	 at	622	 (noting	 that	 the	FATF	added	DNFPBs	 to	 the	2003	FATF	Recommendations	without	sufficient	input	from	the	ABA).	180.	 See	Shepherd,	supra	note	169,	at	620;	see	also	Fin.	Action	Task	Force	on	Money	Laundering,	 Ann.	 Rep.:	 2001–2002,	 18	 (June	 21,	 2002)	 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2001%202002%20ENG.pdf	 [perma.cc/FQ3C-CANQ]	(noting	the	increased	use	by	criminals	of	DNFBPs	in	laundering	funds);	Ann.	Rep.:	
2002–2003,	 supra	 note	 179,	 at	 6	 (“[F]or	 a	 number	 of	 years	 the	 FATF	 has	 observed	 a	displacement	 effect,	whereby	money	 launderers	 seek	 to	 use	 businesses	 or	 professions	outside	 the	 financial	 sector,	 due	 to	 the	 preventive	measures	 being	 put	 in	 place	 in	 the	financial	sector.”).	181 .	 See	 Fin.	 Action	 Task	 Force	 on	 Money	 Laundering,	 Review	 of	 the	 FATF	 Forty	
Recommendations	 Consultation	 Paper,	 ¶	 272	 (May	 30,	 2002),	http://www.antiguagaming.gov.ag/Money%20Laundering/FATF%2040%20Review.pdf	[perma.cc/GK77-VJ4V].	182.	 Aaron	R.	Hutman	et	al.,	Money	Laundering	Enforcement	and	Policy,	39	INT’L	LAW.	649,	 660	 (2005);	 see	 also	 Fed’n	 of	 Law	 Societies	 of	 Canada	 v.	 Canada	 (Attorney	 Gen.),	[2013]	 B.C.C.A.	 147,	 para.	 93	 (Can.)	 (“Lawyers	 often	 have	 specific	 knowledge	 of	 their	clients’	activities	and	the	circumstances	surrounding	the	transaction	in	question.”).	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1415	The	FATF	further	noted	that	criminals	will	sometimes	use	lawyer-client	 accounts	 for	 the	placement	 and	 layering	of	 funds	directly,	which	offers	the	launderer	even	further	privilege	protection.183	
A.	United	Kingdom	Application	of	Lawyer’s	Guidance	1.	UK’s	AML	Regime	a.	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2007	The	 two	central	pieces	of	 legislation	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	that	address	AML/CFT	regulations	are	the	Regulations	2007	and	POCA.184 	The	 Regulations	 2007	 establish	 CDD	 requirements	 for	relevant	 persons,	 which	 includes	 “independent	 legal	professionals”	carrying	out	the	Lawyer’s	Guidance’s	five	specified	activities. 185 	The	 Regulations	 2007	 also	 adopted	 the	 risk-based	approach	 and	 CDD	 requirements	 outlined	 by	 the	 Lawyer’s	Guidance,	 including	 identifying	 the	 beneficial	 ownership	 of	 a	client.186	The	 Regulations	 2007	 define	 a	 beneficial	 owner	 as	 an	individual	 who	 owns	 more	 than	 twenty-five	 percent	 of	 the	interest, 187 	or	 otherwise	 exercises	 control	 over	 the	 entity	 or	trust;188	or,	 if	 the	 legal	 entity	 or	 arrangement	 is	 not	 a	 corporate	body,	 partnership,	 or	 trust,	 an	 individual	 who	 benefits	 from	 or	controls	 at	 least	 twenty-five	 percent	 of	 the	 property	 of	 the	entity.189	If	the	solicitor190	is	unable	to	perform	the	CDD	requirements	to	identify	the	customer	and	beneficial	owner	before	the	business	
 183.	 See	Review	of	the	FATF	Forty	Recommendations	Consultation	Paper,	supra	note	181,	¶	272.	184.	 See	generally	Terrill	II	&	Breslow,	supra	note	171.	185.	 See	 infra	 text	 accompanying	 note	 218;	 see	 also	 The	 Money	 Laundering	Regulations	2007,	SI	2007/2157,	art.	3,	¶	9	(Eng.).	186.	 Compare	The	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2007,	 	supra	note	185,	¶	2,	with	Part	 III.B.	 (discussing	 the	 Lawyer’s	 Guidance	 risk	 assessment	 and	 implementation	requirements).	187.	 See	The	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2007,	supra	note	185,	art.	6,	¶¶	1-3.	188.	 See	id.	189.	 See	 id.	 art.	 6,	 ¶	 6	 (“[W]here	 the	 individuals	 who	 benefit	 from	 the	 entity	 or	arrangement	have	yet	to	be	determined,	[the	beneficial	owner	is]	the	class	of	persons	in	whose	main	interest	the	entity	or	arrangement	is	set	up	or	operates.”).	190.	 The	UK	has	a	division	of	two	distinct	legal	professions,	Solicitors	and	Barristers.	Barristers	are	primarily	advocates	who	have	virtual	monopoly	rights	on	trial	work	in	the	higher	courts	and	Solicitors	are	primarily	office	lawyers	who	advise	clients,	negotiate	and	
1416	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	relationship	or	 transaction	begins,191	the	 solicitor	may	not	begin	either	 the	 business	 relationship	 or	 transaction. 192 	After	establishing	 the	 relationship,	 the	 solicitor	 is	 still	 required	 to	monitor	ongoing	transactions	to	ensure	they	are	consistent	with	the	practitioner’s	“knowledge	of	the	customer,	his	business[,]	and	risk	profile.”193	The	Regulations	2007	also	require	 that	 solicitors	keep	 CDD	 records	 for	 five	 years, 194 	maintain	 policies	 and	procedures	 relating	 to	 their	 CDD	 program, 195 	and	 ensure	 all	relevant	employees	are	trained	in	AML/CFT	laws	and	policies.196	b.	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	POCA	 imposes	 criminal	 penalties	 on	 individuals	 who	participate	 in	 money	 laundering	 or	 who	 become	 aware	 of	 or	suspect	money	 laundering	 and	 fail	 to	 report	 it.197	POCA	 further	makes	 it	 a	 crime	 to	 conceal	 criminal	 property;198	enter	 into	 an	arrangement	 one	 knows	 or	 suspects	 involves	 the	 control	 of	criminal	 property; 199 	or	 acquire,	 use,	 or	 have	 possession	 of	criminal	property.200	However,	solicitors	who	disclose	suspicious	activity	 to	 the	 government	 and	 seek	 consent	 to	 proceed	 are	
 draft	documents,	interview	witnesses,	and	prepare	cases	that	will	be	tried	by	Barristers.	Maimon	Schwarzschild,	The	English	Legal	Professions:	An	Indeterminate	Sentence,	10	FED.	SENT’G	REP.	253,	253	(1998).	191.	 However,	the	verification	may	be	completed	“during	the	establishment	of”	the	business	relationship	if	it	is	“necessary	not	to	interrupt	the	normal	conduct	of	business”	and	 “there	 is	 little	 risk	 of	money	 laundering	 or	 terrorist	 financing	 occurring.”	 See	The	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2007,	supra	note	185,	art.	9,	¶	3.	192.	 See	id.	art.	11,	¶	1.	However,	this	rule	does	not	apply	“where	a	lawyer	or	other	professional	 adviser	 is	 in	 the	 course	 of	 ascertaining	 the	 legal	 position	 for	 his	 client	 or	performing	 his	 task	 of	 defending	 or	 representing	 that	 client	 in,	 or	 concerning,	 legal	proceedings,	including	advice	on	the	institution	or	avoidance	of	proceedings.”	See	id.	art.	11,	¶	2.	193.	 See	id.	art.	8,	¶¶	1-3.	194.	 See	id.	art.	19,	¶¶	1-3.	195.	 See	id.	art.	20.	196.	 See	id.	art.	21.	197.	 See	Terrill	II	&	Breslow,	supra	note	171,	at	442;	see	also	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29	(U.K.).	198.	 See	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§	327	(U.K.);	see	also	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	 c.	29,	§	340	 (U.K.)	 (defining	criminal	 conduct	as	 conduct	 that	 “constitutes	an	offence	 in	 any	 part	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom”	 and	 criminal	 property	 as	 property	 that	constitutes	“a	person’s	benefit	from	criminal	conduct	or	it	represents	such	a	benefit”	and	the	offender	“knows	or	suspects	that	it	constitutes	or	represents	such	a	benefit.”).	199.	 See	id.	§	328.	200.	 See	id.	§	329.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1417	provided	a	legal	defense	for	continuing	their	work.201	A	solicitor’s	failure	 to	 disclose	 does	 not	 require	 that	 the	 solicitor	 actively	participated	 in	 the	 conduct,	 and	 it	 even	 applies	 if	 the	 solicitor	declined	the	representation.202	It	is	also	criminal	for	a	solicitor	to	“tip	 off”	 a	 client	 that	 a	 disclosure	 has	 been	 made	 and	 an	investigation	 is	 ongoing 203 	or	 “prejudice	 an	 investigation”	 by	making	a	disclosure	likely	to	obstruct	the	investigation.204	To	 balance	 the	 requirement	 that	 solicitors	 report	 on	 their	client’s	 activities	 with	 the	 ethical	 obligation	 of	 attorney	confidentiality,	POCA	includes	exceptions	to	preserve	privilege	for	these	 criminal	 sanctions. 205 	The	 key	 question	 is	 whether	 the	solicitor	 obtained	 client	 information	 in	 privileged	circumstances,206	or	 in	connection	with	providing	 legal	advice	or	in	 connection	 with	 a	 legal	 proceeding.207	This	 does	 not	 include	information	communicated	to	a	solicitor	for	a	criminal	purpose.208	When	a	client	seeks	a	solicitor’s	advice	with	criminal	 intent,	and	the	 solicitor	 suspects	 money	 laundering,	 that	 solicitor	 must	disclose	 under	 POCA	 and	 file	 a	 SAR. 209 	The	 standard	 for	 the	crime/fraud	exception	to	be	applied	is	if	a	solicitor	either	knows	the	transaction	he	is	working	on	is	a	principal	offense210	or	knows	of	prima	facie	evidence	that	his	services	are	being	used	to	further	a	 crime. 211 	However,	 there	 is	 an	 exception	 to	 this	 exception,	allowing	 a	 solicitor	 to	 claim	 a	 reasonable	 excuse	 defense	 if	 he	genuinely,	but	mistakenly,	believed	that	privilege	applied.212	
 201.	 See	 id.	§§	327(2)(a),	328(2)(a),	329(2)(a);	see	also	Terrill	 II	&	Breslow,	supra	note	171,	at	445.	202.	 Terrill	II	&	Breslow,	supra	note	171,	at	447-48.	203.	 Id.	at	448	(citing	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§§	330A(1),	330A(3)	(U.K.)).	204.	 See	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§	342(2)	(U.K.).	205.	 See	Terrill	II	&	Breslow,	supra	note	171,	at	449-50;	see	also	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§	330(6)	(U.K.)	(discussing	the	exception	for	a	failure	to	disclose),	Proceeds	of	 Crime	 Act	 2002,	 c.	 29,	 §	 333D(2)	 (U.K.)	 (discussing	 an	 exception	 for	 tipping	 off),	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§	342(3)(c)	(U.K.).	206.	 Terrill	II	&	Breslow,	supra	note	171,	at	449	(citing	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§	330(6)	(U.K.)).	207.	 Id.	(citing	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§	330(10)	(U.K.)).	208.	 Id.;	see	also	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§	330(11)	(U.K.).	209.	 Terrill	II	&	Breslow,	supra	note	171,	at	451;	see	also	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§	330(b)(6)	(U.K.).	210.	 Legal	 Sector	 Affinity	 Group,	 Anti-Money	 Laundering:	 Guidance	 for	 the	 Legal	
Sector,	THE	L.	SOC’Y	¶	7.4.5	(2018)	(“If	you	know	the	transaction	you’re	working	on	 is	a	principal	offence,	you	risk	committing	an	offence	yourself.”).	211.	 Id.	¶	7.4.5	(citing	O’Rourke	v	Darbishire	[1920]	AC	581).	212.	 Id.	¶	7.4.5.	
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B.	The	FATF’s	“Lawyer’s	Guidance”	To	understand	how	lawyers	in	the	United	Kingdom	regulate	AML	 risks	 using	 the	 risk-based	 approach,	 it	 is	 important	 to	examine	the	FATF’s	guidance,	which	was	the	basis	for	the	United	Kingdom’s	 approach. 213 	The	 Lawyer’s	 Guidance	 was	 adopted	during	a	2008	plenary	meeting	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	response	to	the	FATF’s	concerns	of	lawyer’s	services	being	used	to	facilitate	money	laundering. 214 	This	 guidance	 was	 meant	 to	 indicate	 how	 an	effective	risk-based	approach	should	be	designed	and	was	meant	to	be	read	in	conjunction	with	the	FATF’s	Recommendations.215	1.	Overview	of	the	“Lawyer’s	Guidance”	The	Lawyer’s	Guidance	outlines	the	risk	factors	that	lawyers	need	to	account	for	in	developing	a	risk-based	system.216	It	is	not	prescriptive	and	should	be	applied	based	on	each	country’s	unique	circumstances,	 accounting	 for	 how	 the	 legal	 profession	 in	 each	country	is	regulated.217	It	only	applies	to	lawyers	who	prepare	for	and	carry	out	transactions	concerning	one	or	more	of	the	FATF’s	Recommendation’s	 five	 specified	 activities,	 including:	 (1)	 real	estate	transactions;	(2)	client	money	and	securities	management;	(3)	the	management	of	bank	savings	and	securities	accounts;	(4)	contribution	 organization	 for	 the	 creation,	 operation	 or	management	 of	 companies;	 or	 (5)	 the	 creation,	 operation,	 or	management	 of	 legal	 arrangements,	 and	 buying	 and	 selling	 of	business	 entities. 218 	However,	 lawyers	 who	 provide	 services	 or	advice	peripheral	to	the	overall	transaction	are	not	considered	to	
 213 .	 See	 The	 Money	 Laundering	 Regulations	 2007,	 Explanatory	 Memorandum	 1	(Eng.)	 (explaining	 that	 the	Money	 Laundering	 Regulations	 2007	were	 implemented	 to	make	U.K.	money	laundering	regulations	better	reflect	the	FATF	40	Recommendations).	214.	 See	Shepherd,	supra	note	169,	at	626-47;	see	also	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	 157,	 at	 4	 (“After	 further	 international	 consultation	 with	 both	 public	 and	 private	sectors,	 the	 FATF	 adopted	 this	 [Legal	 Professional]	 Guidance	 at	 its	 October	 2008	Plenary.”).	215.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	4-7.	216.	 See	 Shepherd,	 supra	 note	 169,	 at	 647-48;	 see	 also	 generally	 Fin.	 Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157.	217.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	15.	218.	 See	id.	at	6-7;	see	also	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	7,	¶	22(d).	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1419	be	preparing	for	or	carrying	out	the	transaction	and	therefore,	are	not	required	to	observe	AML	obligations.219	Illustrating	the	determination	of	which	 lawyers	are	covered	by	the	Lawyer’s	Guidance,	Kevin	Shepherd,	a	real	estate	attorney	practitioner,	offers	an	example	of	a	 local	 real	estate	 lawyer	who	advises	 on	 local	 law	 issues	 for	 a	 “purchase	 of	 a	 multistate	 real	property	portfolio.”220	The	portfolio	transaction	involves	property	in	ten	states,	but	the	local	lawyer	is	approached	to	only	advise	on	potential	 legal	 issues	 in	 California. 221 	The	 local	 lawyer	 never	represented	the	client	 in	the	past,	never	met	the	client,	and	only	sends	her	invoices	to	the	referring	attorney.222	The	local	attorney	still	 runs	 a	 conflict	 check,	 which	 comes	 back	 satisfactory. 223	Shepherd	concludes	that	the	local	counsel’s	role	is	peripheral	and	not	preparing	for	or	carrying	out	the	transaction,	so	she	need	not	verify	the	client’s	beneficial	ownership.224	2.	Risk	Assessment	under	the	“Lawyer’s	Guidance”	The	Lawyer’s	Guidance	maps	out	the	implementation	of	the	risk-based	approach	in	three	steps:	(1)	assessing	the	risks	of	the	lawyer’s	 practice,	 (2)	 performing	 due	 diligence	 on	 customers	based	 on	 those	 risks,	 and	 (3)	 implementing	 internal	 controls	 to	ensure	an	effective	risk-based	approach.225	Initially,	 the	 law	 firm	should	 assess	 its	 risk	 through	 three	 categories:	 the	country/geographic,	 client,	 and	 service	 risks. 226 	There	 is	 no	universal	definition	of	a	country’s	risk,	but	some	indicators	of	risk	include	 (1)	 the	 existence	 of	 “sanction,	 embargoes,	 or	 similar	measures”	 issued	 by	 bodies	 such	 as	 the	 United	 Nations;	 (2)	 lax	
 219.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	7;	see	also	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	
supra	note	157,	at	30	(“Subject	to	other	factors	.	.	.	providing	limited	legal	services	in	the	capacity	 of	 a	 local	 or	 special	 counsel	 may	.	.	.	 mean	 that	 the	 legal	 professional	 is	 not	“preparing	 for”	 or	 “carrying	 out”	 a	 transaction	 for	 a	 regulated	 activity	 specified	 in	Recommendation	12.”).	220.	 See	Shepherd,	supra	note	169,	at	659.	221.	 See	id.	222.	 See	id.	223.	 See	id.	at	659-60.	224.	 See	id.	at	660.	225.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	25-35.	226.	 Though,	 the	Lawyer’s	Guidance	notes	 that	 these	categories	are	only	 the	most	“commonly	identified	risk	categories”	and	that	“there	is	no	universally	accepted	set	of	risk	categories.”	See	id.	
1420	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	AML/CFT	 laws;	 or	 (3)	 the	 existence	 of	 significant	 corruption.227	Clients	whose	 activities	may	 indicate	 a	 higher	 risk	 include	 cash	intensive	 clients,	 clients	 using	 intermediaries	 not	 subject	 to	adequate	AML/CFT	laws,	or	clients	conducting	business	in	unusual	circumstances.228	Further,	the	lawyer	should	assess	the	context	of	the	 services	 being	 offered,	 accounting	 for	 any	 mitigating	circumstances	that	would	warrant	increased	risk	assessment.229	The	Lawyer’s	Guidance	also	includes	another	“variable”	risk	factor,	accounting	for	the	“differences	in	practices,	size,	scale	and	expertise,	 amongst	 legal	 professionals.”230	A	 significant	 factor	 is	whether	the	proposed	work	would	be	unusual	or	suspicious	for	the	particular	legal	professional.231	This	risk	factor	allows	the	lawyer	to	tailor	their	risk	assessment	to	the	size	and	scope	of	their	own	individual	practice.232	For	example,	one	of	 the	 factors	potentially	triggering	a	higher	risk	assessment	includes	services	to	improperly	conceal	 beneficial	 ownership	 information; 233 	however,	 for	 real	estate	 attorneys,	 concealing	 a	 beneficial	 owner	 for	 a	 real	 estate	developer	 seeking	 to	 purchase	 adjoining	 land	 parcels	 through	fictitious	names	 to	avoid	price-run	ups	may	not	be	untoward.234	Additionally,	 another	 risk	 factor	 is	 for	 services	 that	 deliberately	depend	 upon	 more	 anonymity	 regarding	 client	 identity	 than	 is	normal	 under	 the	 circumstances, 235 	but	 for	 a	 sophisticated	transactional	 attorney,	 tiered	 ownership	 structures	 created	 for	legitimate	tax	and	liability	reasons	may	be	normal.236	3.	Application	of	Risk-Based	Approach	After	 the	 risk	 assessment,	 the	 lawyer	 should	 perform	 CDD,	which	 enables	 a	 legal	 professional	 to	 form	 a	 reasonable	 belief	about	 the	 true	 identity	 of	 each	 client.237	The	 standard	 diligence	
 227.	 See	id.	at	26.	228.	 See	id.	at	28.	229.	 See	id.	230.	 See	id.	at	29.	231.	 See	id	at	31-32.	232.	 See	id.	at	29-31	(listing	the	factors	to	account	for	in	the	assessment	of	variable	risk).	233.	 See	id.	at	28.	234 .	 See	 Shepherd,	 supra	 note	 169,	 at	 655-56	 (noting	 that	 if	 the	 landowners	discovered	the	true	beneficial	owner	had	deep	pockets,	that	might	drive	up	the	prices).	235.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	29.	236.	 See	Shepherd,	supra	note	169,	at	656-57.	237.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,		supra	note	157,	at	31.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1421	should	 include	procedures	 to:	 (1)	 identify	and	verify	 the	client’s	identity,	 (2)	 identify	and	 take	reasonable	measures	 to	verify	 the	client’s	 beneficial	 owner,	 and	 (3)	 understand	 the	 client’s	circumstances	and	business.238	The	CDD	will	be	 informed	by	 the	initial	risk	assessment,	and	a	practitioner	may	reduce	the	standard	level	 of	 due	 diligence	 “after	 consideration	 of	 appropriate	 risk	variables,	 and	 in	 recognized	 lower	 risk	 scenarios”	 such	 as	 in	representing	publicly	listed	companies,	financial	institutions	with	strong	 AML/CFT	 controls,	 or	 certain	 government	 entities. 239	Conversely,	 if	 the	client	 is	deemed	higher	risk,	 increased	CDD	or	enhanced	due	diligence	may	be	warranted.240	Lawyers	should	then	continually	monitor	clients	for	changing	risk	 factors,	money	 laundering,	 or	 terrorist	 financing	 activity.241	The	nature	of	the	monitoring	depends	on	the	type	and	size	of	the	firm,	the	AML/CFT	risks	identified,	and	the	nature	of	the	regulated	activity	 provided. 242 	This	 monitoring	 is	 not	 meant	 to	 be	 a	deputation	of	legal	professionals,	but	is	instead	only	maintaining	awareness	 while	 working	 for	 a	 client. 243 	The	 FATF	 originally	wanted	 to	 impose	 Suspicious	 Transaction	 Reporting	 (“STR”)	requirements	 on	 legal	 professionals,	 but	 after	 lawyer	 groups	argued	 that	 this	 would	 run	 afoul	 of	 attorney	 duties	 of	confidentiality	 and	 injure	 attorney-client	 relations,	 244 	the	 FATF	left	 the	 determination	 to	 countries	 to	 proscribe	 their	 own	regulatory	requirements.245	The	Lawyer’s	Guidance	acknowledges	that	 law	 firms	 “differ	 significantly	 from	 financial	 institutions	 in	terms	of	size,”	noting	that	unlike	financial	 institutions,	many	law	firms	are	much	smaller	and	therefore,	the	framework	for	internal	controls	 should	 account	 for	 this	 difference.246	The	 extent	 of	 the	AML/CFT	 controls	 needs	 to	 be	 proportionate	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 the	services	offered,	and	legal	professionals	should	examine	their	own	
 238.	 See	id.	at	32.	239.	 See	id.	240.	 See	id.	at	31.	241.	 See	id.	at	32-33.	242.	 See	id.	at	32.	243.	 See	id.	at	32-33.	244.	 See	Shepherd,	 supra	 note	 169,	 at	 635-36	 (citing	Memorandum	 from	Edward	Manigault	summarizing	the	Paris	meeting	(Apr.	29,	2008)	(on	file	with	author)).	245.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	33	¶	120.	246 .	 See	 id.	 at	 34,	 ¶	 123.	 (“For	 a	 number	 of	 DNFBPs,	 a	 single	 person	 may	 be	responsible	for	the	functions	of	front	office,	back	office,	money	laundering	reporting,	and	senior	management.”).	
1422	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	practice’s	 profile	 in	 determining	 the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 the	controls.247	4.	Ambiguity	of	the	Risk-Based	Approach	under	the	Lawyer’s	Guidance	There	is	ambiguity,	however,	in	when	a	legal	professional	is	preparing	for	and	carrying	out	a	specified	activity,	as	the	Lawyer’s	Guidance	does	not	define	these	terms	beyond	explaining	that	legal	professionals	 providing	 “advice	 or	 services	.	.	.	 peripheral	 to	 the	overall	transaction”	would	not	be	subject	to	AML	requirements.248	This	determination	should	be	made	on	a	case-by-case	basis	with	consideration	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 local	 counsel’s	 involvement	 in	relation	to	 the	overall	 transaction,	 though	there	 is	no	bright	 line	rule	 as	 to	when	 the	 services	would	be	 considered	peripheral.249	Once	a	lawyer	determines	that	he	has	crossed	the	threshold	to	a	more	 central	 role	 in	 the	 transaction,	 the	 lawyer	 would	 then	 be	required	to	employ	appropriate	AML/CFT	measures.250	The	definition	of	the	specified	activities251	covered	under	the	Lawyer’s	 Guidance	 can	 also	 be	 ambiguous.	 For	 example,	 the	“[b]uying	 and	 selling	 of	 real	 estate”	 is	 not	 defined	 in	 either	 the	Lawyer’s	 Guidance	 or	 in	 the	 FATF	 Recommendations. 252 	This	language	 does	 not	 address	 whether	 financing	 real	 estate	transactions	 or	 leasing	 activities	 fall	within	 this	 category.253	The	risk	factors	themselves	can	also	be	ambiguous,	such	as	what	would	constitute	 “readily	 apparent	 inadequate	 consideration”	 for	 a	transaction	under	the	Lawyer’s	Guidance.254	Further,	the	Lawyer’s	
 247.	 	 See	 id.	 at	 34-35,	 ¶	 125-26	 (detailing	 the	 fourteen-point	 framework	 that	 law	firm’s	internal	controls	should	include).	248.	 See	id.	at	6-7,	¶	13.	249.	 Kevin	Shepherd	provides	 several	 examples	of	different	 levels	of	 involvement	and	whether	they	constitute	“preparing	for	and	carrying	out”	a	transaction,	but	he	does	not	define	the	degree	of	involvement	that	would	reach	that	point.	See	Shepherd,	supra	note	169,	at	668-69.	250.	 See	id.	at	668;	see	also	FATF,	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	13,	¶	49.	251.	 See	supra	Part	III.B.1.	252.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157;	see	also	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	7.	253.	Though,	based	on	his	discussion,	Kevin	Shepherd	appears	to	believe	that	“leasing	activities”	 would	 not	 be	 covered	 under	 the	 “[b]uying	 and	 selling	 of	 real	 estate.”	 See	Shepherd,	supra	note	169,	at	649-50.	254.	 See	id.	at	28.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1423	Guidance	 does	 not	 explain	 if	 the	 determination	 of	 what	 is	inadequate	should	be	made	on	an	objective	or	subjective	basis.255	
C.	ABA	Opposition	to	AML	Regulations	for	Lawyers	While	the	United	Kingdom	has	adopted	AML	regulations	for	its	 lawyers, 256 	in	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 ABA	 opposes	 the	implementation	 of	 AML	 regulations	 on	 American	 legal	professionals. 257 	The	 ABA	 argues	 that	 imposing	 such	 AML/CFT	requirements	on	American	lawyers	would	injure	the	confidential	lawyer-client	relationship	and	that	it	would	“impose	burdensome,	costly,	 and	 unworkable	 beneficial	 ownership	 reporting	requirements	 on	 small	 businesses,	 their	 lawyers,	 and	 states.”258	The	 ABA	 also	 argues	 that	 the	 reporting	 requirements	 are	unnecessary	because	there	are	more	effective	regulatory	tools	that	have	 been	 developed	 by	 the	 legal	 profession	 and	 federal	government.259	The	 ABA	 claims	 that	 mandatory	 AML	 regulations	 would	disturb	the	bedrock	principle	of	loyalty	and	confidentiality	central	to	 the	 attorney-client	 relationship,	 which	 are	 critical	 for	 the	independence	 of	 American	 attorneys	 and	 our	 legal	 adversarial	system. 260 	The	 vagueness	 of	 the	 STR	 and	 “no	 tipping	 off”	requirements	combined	with	criminal	sanctions	would	discourage	
 255.	 See	id.	at	656;	see	also	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	28.	256.	 See	supra	Part	III.A.	257.		See	Gatekeeper	Regulations	on	Lawyers,	Key	Points,		A.B.A.,	https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/independence_of_the_legal_profession/bank_secrecy_act/	 [perma.cc/4ZWV-H6P2]	(last	visited	Mar.		29,	2020)	[hereinafter	Gatekeeper	Regulations	on	Lawyers].	258.	 See	 id.;	see	also	 Letter	 from	Kevin	Shepherd	 to	FinCEN	on	Department	of	 the	Treasury	 Financial	 Crimes	 Enforcement	 Network	 Advance	 Notice	 of	 Proposed	Rulemaking—Customer	Due	Diligence	Requirements	for	Financial	Institutions	RIN	1506-AB15,	 77	 Fed.	 Reg.	 13046	 (May	 4,	 2012)	 (on	 file	 with	 A.B.A.),	https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2012may4_customerduediligence_c.authcheckdam.pdf	[perma.cc/2HNL-8QKR].	259.	 See	Gatekeeper	Regulations	on	Lawyers,	supra	note	257.	260.		A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	the	Prof.,	supra	note	143,	at	7;	see	also	William	C.	Hubbard,	Op-Ed:	Confidentiality	Versus	Money-Laundering	Laws,	NAT’L	L.	J.	(Mar.	10,	 2015)	 (“[T]he	 American	 Bar	 Association	.	.	.	 [believes]	 a	 voluntary,	 risk-based	compliance	approach	aimed	at	educating	lawyers	about	how	to	detect	and	prevent	[money	laundering	and	terrorist	 financing]	works	best	and	is	 far	preferable	to	 intrusive	 federal	regulation	of	the	legal	profession	that	would	erode	the	attorney-client	privilege	and	harm	clients.”).	
1424	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	privileged	communications.261	AML/CFT	requirements	could	also	raise	 Sixth	 Amendment	 concerns	 that	 the	 right	 to	 effective	assistance	of	counsel	could	be	jeopardized.262	Lawyer-client	confidentiality	ensures	client	candor	and	trust,	which	are	necessary	for	effective	representation,	and	harming	this	relationship	 will	 harm	 the	 ability	 of	 lawyers	 to	 effectively	represent	 their	 clients.263 	Lawyers	 may	 be	 forced	 to	 view	 each	client	with	suspicion	due	to	the	vagueness	of	the	regulations	and	the	 breadth	 of	 the	 underlying	 offenses. 264 	There	 can	 be	 valid	personal	 and	 professional	 reasons	 for	 a	 desire	 for	 privacy,	including	 individuals	 who	 are	 concerned	 about	 “kidnapping,	personal	 safety,	 and	 identity	 theft” 265 	or	 businesses	 concerned	about	 “trade	 secrets	 and	 business	 plans.” 266 	Further,	confidentiality	 can	 protect	 a	 client’s	 profile	 in	 the	 community,	estate	 planning	 goals,	 or	 solicitations,	 both	 charitable	 and	noncharitable.267	The	ABA	also	noted	that	information	collected	by	the	Internal	Revenue	 Service	 (the	 “IRS”)	 and	 financial	 institutions	 is	 already	adequate	 to	 fight	money	 laundering	 and	 terrorist	 financing	 and	that	the	Voluntary	Guidance	developed	by	the	ABA	is	sufficient	to	regulate	 AML	 concerns	 among	 American	 lawyers	 without	 the	“burdensome	 and	 costly	 rules-based	 approach”	 of	 the	 Lawyer’s	Guidance.268	There	are	also	already	considerable	consequences	for	attorneys	 who	 commit	 money-laundering	 that	 are	 sufficient	 to	
 261.	 A.B.A.	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Reg.	and	the	Prof.,	supra	note	143,	at	16	n.8	(noting	that	although	the	FATF	exempts	“privileged	information”	from	STR	requirements,	the	distinction	between	privileged	and	non-privileged	information	is	likely	to	be	unclear).	262.	 See	Blake	Bryant	Goodsell,	Muted	Advocacy:	Money	Laundering	and	the	Attorney-
Client	Relationship	 in	a	Post	9/11	World,	 34	 J.	LEGAL	PROF.	211,	225-26	 (2009);	 see	also	United	States	v.	Sindel,	53	F.3d	874,	877	(8th	Cir.	1995).	263.	 See	 Danielle	 Jasmin	 Kirby,	 The	 European	 Union’s	 Gatekeeper	 Initiative:	 The	
European	 Union	 Enlists	 Lawyers	 in	 the	 Fight	 against	 Money	 Laundering	 &	 Terrorist	
Financing,	37	HOFSTRA	L.	REV.	261,	310	(2008)	(quoting	Patricia	Shaughnessy,	The	New	EU	
Money-Laundering	Directive:	Lawyers	as	Gate-Keepers	and	Whistle-Blowers,	34	L.	&	POL’Y	INT’L	BUS.	25,	44	(2002)).	264.	 See	id.	265.	 Duncan	E.	Osborne,	The	Financial	Action	Task	Force	and	the	Legal	Profession,	59	N.Y.	L.	SCH.	L.	REV.	421,	428-29	(2014).	266.	 Id.	267.	 Id.	at	429.	268.	 See	Gatekeeper	Regulations	on	Lawyers,	supra	note	257.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1425	deter	 intentional	wrongdoing.269	The	ABA	also	argues	 that	 these	regulations	would	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 effective	 as	well,	 noting	 the	failure	of	SAR	reporting	under	the	BSA.270	In	addition	to	the	ABA,	the	Council	of	Bars	and	Law	Societies	of	Europe	noted	in	2011	that	there	 was	 no	 evidence	 from	 the	 FATF	 that	 lawyers	 were	 being	unwittingly	targeted	by	launderers,	except	in	circumstances	where	a	lawyers	willfully	participates	in	money-laundering.271	
IV.	THE	UNITED	STATES	SHOULD	NOT	ADOPT	AML	
REQUIREMENTS	FOR	LAWYERS	The	 United	 States	 should	 not	 adopt	 AML	 requirements	 for	American	 lawyers	 like	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 but	 should	 instead	continue	 with	 the	 ABA’s	 efforts	 to	 educate	 American	 attorneys	about	money	 laundering	 risks	and	 the	 risk-based	approach.	The	BSA	 has	 already	 proven	 to	 be	 a	 burdensome	 regulatory	 regime	with	little	apparent	impact	on	the	amount	of	money	laundered	in	the	 United	 States	 or	 globally,	 and	 these	 costs	 would	 likely	 be	exacerbated	if	applied	to	legal	professionals	in	the	United	States.	Further,	 invading	 the	 sanctity	 of	 the	 attorney	 duty	 of	confidentiality	could	have	adverse	impacts	on	the	independence	of	the	Bar.	The	current	self-regulating	approach	taken	to	detect	and	prevent	money	laundering	facilitation	among	American	attorneys	is	sufficient	to	regulate	money	laundering	in	the	United	States.	
 269.	 See	Terry,	 supra	note	 144,	 at	 501-02	 (noting	 that	 there	 is	 a	 vast	 network	 of	federal	criminal	laws	and	enforcement	mechanisms”	to	deter	intentional	criminal	acts	and	therefore,	the	focus	of	AML	efforts	should	be	on	education);	see	also	Comment	Letter	on	Preliminary	Reaction	to	Typologies	Draft	from	Kevin	L.	Shepherd,	Chair	of	ABA	Task	Force	on	Gatekeeper	Regulation	and	the	Profession,	to	John	Carlson,	Principal	Administrator	of	FATF	 Secretariat	 ¶2a,	 ¶1a	 (May	 6,	 2013)	 (on	 file	 with	 A.B.A.)	 (noting	 that	 complicit	criminal	activity	by	legal	professionals	is	unusual	and	not	typical).	270.	 See	Letter	 from	Kevin	Shepherd	 to	 John	Carlson,	 supra	 note	269,	¶6	 (“In	 the	United	States	 the	empirical	or	anecdotal	evidence	seems	quite	 the	opposite,	with	many	STRs	being	filed	by	financial	institutions	that	never	result	in	law	enforcement	action.”).	271 .	 See	 CCBE	 Response	 to	 the	 Commission,	 The	 Review	 of	 the	 Third	 Anti-Money	
Laundering	 Directive,	 Council	 of	 Bars	 and	 Law	 Soc’ys	 of	 Eur.,	 	 ¶3.2	 (Sept.	 9,	 2010),	https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/ANTI_MONEY_LAUNDERING/AML_Position_papers/EN_AML_20111021_CCBE_Response_to_the_Commission_The_review_of_the_third_anti-money_laundering_Directive.pdf	 [perma.cc/S8TK-MA7W]	 (noting	 further	 in	 ¶3.5	 that	 even	 assuming	 legal	 professionals	 are	 targeted	 by	money	launderers,	“[e]xperience	seems	to	suggest	that	the	scale	of	the	targeting	is	in	fact	relatively	low	and	the	question	must	therefore	be	asked	if	a	reporting	duty	is	justified.”);	
see	also	Osborne,	supra	note	265,	at	428	(noting	the	FATF	had	no	examples	of	attorneys	becoming	unwittingly	involved	in	a	money	laundering	or	terrorist	financing	scheme).	
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A.	Existing	AML	Regulations	Have	Not	Proven	To	Be	Sufficiently	
Effective	To	Justify	Expanding	Them	To	Lawyers	The	 BSA	 has	 not	 been	 effective	 enough	 in	 reducing	money	laundering	in	the	United	States	to	justify	expanding	its	regulations	to	the	legal	profession.	The	amount	of	money	laundered	globally	and	in	the	United	States	annually	has	not	been	reduced	by	efforts	to	 regulate	 financial	 institutions,	 insurance	 companies,	 casinos,	and	 other	 industries 272 	and	 the	 FATF’s	 evidence	 that	 lawyers	contribute	significantly	to	global	money	laundering	is	inadequate	to	 justify	 imposing	costs	of	billions	of	dollars	on	US	law	firms.273	Further,	one	of	the	reasons	cited	for	expanding	AML	regulations	to	lawyers	is	that	individuals	looking	to	launder	money	may	approach	lawyers	 to	 create	 more	 complex	 entities	 to	 better	 hide	 their	activity 274 	and	 use	 anonymous	 shell	 corporations	 to	 hide	 their	identity	from	law	enforcement	officers.275	The	 Lawyer’s	 Guidance	 specifically	 addresses	 this	 risk	 by	requiring	 that	 lawyers	 identify	 beneficial	 ownership	 when	performing	 due	 diligence.276	However,	 the	 beneficial	 ownership	identification	requirement	under	the	United	Kingdom’s	approach	to	 regulating	 attorney	 money	 laundering	 risks	 is	 substantially	identical	to	the	requirement	now	imposed	on	financial	institutions	in	the	United	States277	and	contains	the	same	problems.278	As	with	US	 financial	 institutions,	 should	 a	 corporate	 shell	 in	 the	 United	Kingdom	 have	 no	 single	 owner	 with	 a	 twenty-five	 percent	 or	greater	stake,	the	lawyer	would	not	need	to	identify	the	owner	of	the	 entity,	 but	 would	 need	 to	 only	 identify	 the	 individual	 who	controls	the	entity,279	who	may	not	actually	be	the	“true	owner”	of	the	corporation’s	assets.280	Shell	 corporations	 are	 also	 easy	 to	 form	 without	 legal	expertise,281	so	adding	these	requirements	may	not	accomplish	the	
 272.	 See	supra	Section	II.B.1.	273.	 See	Council	 of	Bars	 and	Law	Soc’ys	of	Eur.,	 supra	 note	271;	 see	also	Am.	Bar	Found.,	supra	note	64.	274.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	180-83.	275.	 See	supra	Section	II.B.1.a.	276.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	238.	277.	 Compare	supra	text	accompanying	notes	187-89,	with	supra	Section	II.A.2.	278.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	80-83.	279.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	187-89.	280.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	83.	281.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	71-72.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1427	intended	 goal.	 Attorneys	 may	 sometimes	 aid	 suspicious	individuals	in	establishing	anonymous	shell	corporations	without	performing	 appropriate	 due	 diligence, 282 	but	 banks	 have	 been	guilty	 of	 doing	 this	 as	 well,	 at	 least	 prior	 to	 the	 beneficial	ownership	 requirement. 283 	Therefore,	 the	 new	 beneficial	ownership	 identification	 requirements	 on	 financial	 institutions	may	 help	 improve	 this	 problem	 without	 necessitating	 the	expansion	of	burdensome	requirements	to	other	industries.	Another	issue	is	the	potential	for	de-risking	among	law	firms,	which	is	one	of	the	ways	financial	institutions	have	responded	to	the	 current	AML	 regulatory	 scheme.284	For	 financial	 institutions,	de-risking	can	increase	the	possibility	of	money	laundering	as	the	remaining	institutions	in	an	area	are	less	capable	of	handling	the	increased	 AML	 risks. 285 	Law	 firms	 would	 likely	 face	 the	 same	problems.	There	is	the	additional	issue	that	de-risking	among	law	firms	 could	 pose	 Sixth	 Amendment	 issues	 in	 certain	 industries,	within	 certain	 geographic	 areas,	 or	 even	 to	 certain	 clients286	as	these	 individuals	 will	 be	 unable	 to	 solicit	 legal	 representation.	Further,	 scrutiny	on	 international	business	and	money	 transfers	has	pushed	smaller	financial	institutions	away	from	international	customers,287	however,	if	applied	to	law	firms,	it	could	discourage	important	work	that	lawyers	do	internationally	in	areas	of	human	rights,	international	development,	and	other	pro	bono	matters.288	De-risking	also	poses	implications	for	the	independence	of	the	Bar	 and	 Judiciary	 because	 de-risking	 is	 done	 in	 response	 to	regulatory	scrutiny.289	When	regulators	identify	a	certain	area	as	high	risk,	banks	have	responded	by	de-risking,	as	was	the	case	for	the	southwest	border,	money	service	businesses,	embassies,	and	
 282.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	76-77.	283.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	75.	284.	 See	supra	Section	II.B.2.c.	285.	 See	Adisa,	supra	note	122,	at	16.	286.	 See	 supra	 text	 accompanying	 notes	 126-27	 (noting	 the	 types	 of	 sectors	 and	clients	who	have	lost	access	to	banking	services).	287.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	128-29.	288.	 See	 Jones	Day,	Pro	Bono	and	Public	Service:	Giving	Back	Worldwide	23	(2010)	(highlighting	Jones	Day’s	economic	development	work	in	Rwanda);	see	also	Orrick,	Impact	
Finance,	 ORRICK,	 HERRINGTON	 &	 SUTCLIFFE,	 https://www.orrick.com/Practices/Impact-Finance	[perma.cc/DQ9U-GKMH]	(last	visited	Mar.	28,	2020)	(highlighting	Orrick’s	Impact	Finance	and	Investment	global	Pro	Bono	work,	which	works	to	raise	“the	quality	of	life	for	people	in	every	part	of	the	world.”)	289.	 See	supra	Section	II.B.2.c.	
1428	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	international	 customers. 290 	This	 means	 the	 government	 could	push	 law	 firms,	 and	 especially	 smaller	 law	 firms,	 out	 of	 certain	industries	 or	 areas	by	 imposing	more	 scrutiny	 and	more	 severe	penalties	on	firms	that	engage	those	areas.	Requiring	attorneys	to	file	SARS	would	also	not	improve	the	current	AML	regulatory	scheme.	Financial	institutions	file	millions	of	 SARs	 each	 year, 291 	many	 of	 which	 do	 not	 result	 in	 a	 law	enforcement	 response. 292 	If	 millions	 of	 SARs	 a	 year	 are	 only	producing	 about	 1,200	money	 laundering	 convictions,293	adding	more	 SAR	 filings	 will	 accomplish	 little.	 Beyond	 cost,	 requiring	lawyers	 to	 file	 SARs	would	 fundamentally	 change	 the	 attorneys’	position	 in	 the	 US	 legal	 system	 as	 one	 of	 confidentiality	 and	privilege. 294 	Forcing	 attorneys	 to	 look	 at	 every	 client	 with	suspicion	 could	 chill	 the	 attorney-client	 relationship,	 making	clients	 less	 candid	 and	 making	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 lawyers	 to	represent	 their	 clients. 295 	Disturbing	 this	 bedrock	 principle	 by	forcing	 attorneys	 to	 report	 on	 their	 client’s	 activity	 to	 the	government	may	 be	 justifiable	 if	 there	were	 some	 considerable	benefit,	but	there	is	not	enough	evidence	that	growing	the	pile	of	unused	SARs	would	generate	any	such	benefit.296	Further,	 the	 United	 Kingdom’s	 efforts	 to	 expand	 money	laundering	 regulations	 to	 solicitors	 have	 failed	 to	 reduce	 the	amount	 of	 money	 laundered	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 While	 the	exact	scale	of	money	laundered	in	the	United	Kingdom	cannot	be	determined	with	certainty,297	there	is	still	a	significant	amount	of	
 290.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	126-27.	291.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	51.	292.	 See	Letter	from	Kevin	Shepherd	to	John	Carlson,	supra	note	269,	¶6.	293.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	67.	294.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	260.	295.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	264.	296.	 See	Letter	from	Kevin	Shepherd	to	John	Carlson,	supra	note	269,	¶6.	297.	 See	Hilary	Osborne,	UK	vulnerable	to	money	laundering	on	a	massive	scale,	finds	
MPs,	 GUARDIAN	 (Mar.	 7,	 2019),	 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/08/uk-vulnerable-to-money-laundering-on-a-massive-scale-find-mps	[perma.cc/DZ2K-LF87];	 see	 also	 Anton	Moisenko	 &	 Tom	 Keatinge,	 The	 Scale	 of	 Money	
Laundering	in	the	UK:	Too	Big	to	Measure?,	ROYAL	UNITED	SERVS.	INST.	FOR	DEF.	&	SEC.	STUDIES	10	 (2019),	https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20190211_moiseienko_and_keatinge_extent_of_money_laundering_web.pdf	[perma.cc/S5PB-RK84]	(“It	is	unlikely	that	the	UK	government	or	researchers	will	be	able	to	produce	a	comprehensive	estimate	of	money	laundering	in	the	UK.”).	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1429	money	 laundered	 through	 the	 United	 Kingdom.298	In	 fact,	many	consider	 London	 to	 be	 the	 money	 laundering	 capital	 of	 the	world. 299 	Without	 any	 evidence	 that	 the	 United	 Kingdom’s	expanded	 approach	 to	 regulating	 money	 laundering	 risks	 has	reduced	the	amount	of	money	laundered	in	its	economy,	the	United	States	should	not	follow	suit	and	risk	billions	of	dollars	in	costs300	for	an	uncertain	benefit.	
B.	The	Expense	Of	Expanding	AML	Requirements	To	Lawyers	Would	
Be	Significant	The	cost	of	the	current	AML	requirements	on	banks	has	been	significant301	and	it	would	likely	be	the	same	for	attorneys	if	they	are	 required	 to	 implement	 AML	 policies.	 Under	 the	 United	Kingdom’s	 approach,	 attorneys	 in	 the	 United	 States	 would	 be	required	to	comply	with	many	of	the	same	AML	requirements	as	financial	institutions	in	the	Unites	States,	including	implementing	a	risk-based	analysis	of	customers,	performing	CDD,	implementing	internal	controls,	and	ensuring	appropriate	employee	training	on	how	 to	 identify	 and	 prevent	 money	 laundering	 and	 terrorist	financing. 302 	Multiple	 studies	 have	 already	 found	 that	 AML	regulations	 are	 among	 the	 most	 significant	 that	 financial	institutions	 face,303	and	those	 institutions	already	 face	numerous	burdensome	 regulations. 304 	Law	 firms	 conversely,	 are	 typically	
 298.	 See	 Chris	 Stokel-Walker,	Why	 the	 UK	 is	 losing	 its	 costly	 battle	 against	money	
laundering,	WIRED	(Dec.	10,	2018),	https://www.wired.co.uk/article/money-laundering-in-the-uk-russian-banks	[perma.cc/N4UW-KQN3];	see	also	Chris	Stokel-Walker,	New	data	
shows	 London’s	 property	 boom	 is	 a	 money	 laundering	 horror,	 WIRED	 (Apr.	 9,	 2019),	https://www.wired.co.uk/article/money-laundering-hmrc-tax-update	 [perma.cc/QTY9-QGTT];	 London’s	 financial	 flows	 are	 polluted	 by	 laundered	 money,	 ECONOMIST	 (Oct.	 11,	2018),	 https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/10/11/londons-financial-flows-are-polluted-by-laundered-money	[perma.cc/7LU4-EEJE].	299 .	 See	 Avinash	 D	 Persaud,	 London:	 the	 money	 laundering	 capital	 of	 the	 world,	PROSPECT	 MAGAZINE	 (Apr.	 27,	 2017),	 https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/economics-and-finance/london-the-money-laundering-capital-of-the-world	 [perma.cc/9WPV-DKXC];	see	also	Nico	Hines,	London:	The	World’s	Money	Laundering	Capital,	DAILY	BEAST	(Jul.	 8,	 2015),	 https://www.thedailybeast.com/london-the-worlds-money-laundering-capital	[perma.cc/M4NJ-TTSS].	300.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.2.	301.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.2.	302.	 Compare	supra	Part	III.B.3,	with	supra	Part	II.A.2.	303.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	103-08.	304.	 See	Lux	&	Greene,	supra	note	104,	at	23.	
1430	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	regulated	 at	 the	 state	 level, 305 	and	 imposing	 these	 onerous	regulatory	 burdens	 on	 them,	 which	 even	 major	 financial	institutions	 find	 burdensome,306	would	 significantly	 change	 how	law	 firms	 operate	 and	 structure	 themselves.	 These	 costs	 would	then	 get	 passed	 down	 to	 clients,	 which	 would	 further	 restrict	access	to	affordable	legal	representation.	Law	firms	are	also	fundamentally	structured	differently	than	financial	institutions.307	While	a	majority	of	banking	is	performed	by	 a	 smaller	 number	 of	 large	 banks, 308 	the	 number	 of	 lawyers	employed	by	small	firms	is	significant.309	AML	requirements	have	had	 a	 disproportionate	 impact	 on	 small	 financial	 institutions310	and	 if	 they	 were	 expanded	 to	 cover	 attorneys,	 this	disproportionate	 impact	would	be	the	norm	of	the	 industry.	The	Lawyer’s	Guidance	does	include	variables	in	its	analysis	to	account	for	 the	different	sizes	of	 law	firms,	allowing	 them	to	account	 for	their	 lack	of	manpower	 in	 their	approach	to	AML	compliance;311	however,	banks	are	also	permitted	to	take	a	risk-based	approach	in	AML	regulations312	and	it	has	not	helped	them	to	avoid	targeting	from	regulators.313	
 305.	 See	 Rhonda	 McMillion,	 ABA	 and	 Other	 Bar	 Groups	 Work	 to	 Limit	 Federal	
Regulation	 of	 Lawyers,	 AM.	 BAR	 ASS’N	 J.	 (Dec.	 2010),	http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/let_the_states_do_it_aba_working_to_limit_federal_regulation_of_lawyers	[perma.cc/SYW7-FQWJ].	306.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	103-08.	307.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	246.	308.	 See	Camden	R.	Fine,	BankThink	No,	there	aren’t	too	many	banks	in	the	U.S.,	AM.	BANKER	(Oct.	25,	2017,	9:30	AM),	https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/no-there-arent-too-many-banks-in-the-us	 [perma.cc/99AM-TB3E]	 (“Just	 0.2%	 of	 U.S.	 banks	 hold	more	than	two-thirds	of	industry	assets.”);	see	also	Hester	Peirce	&	Stephen	Matteo	Miller,	
Small	 Banks	 by	 the	 Numbers,	 2000	 –	 2004,	 MERCATUS	 CTR.	 (Mar.	 17,	 2015),	https://www.mercatus.org/publication/small-banks-numbers-2000-2014	[perma.cc/C6AR-BABA]	(“Since	the	financial	crisis,	US	banking	assets	and	deposits	have	continued	a	long	trend	of	consolidation	in	a	handful	of	large	banks.”).	309.	 See	 Margaret	 Grisdela,	 Overview	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Legal	 Market,	 HG.ORG,	https://www.hg.org/marketing-us-market.html	[perma.cc/HJ5D-JDQ2]	(last	visited	Apr.	14,	2020)	(“The	vast	majority	of	attorneys	in	private	practice	(70%)	work	in	a	law	firm	with	 ten	or	 fewer	attorneys.	 In	 fact,	 a	 solo	practice	 is	 the	 career	and	 lifestyle	 choice	of	almost	half	(48%)	of	private	legal	practitioners.	Only	14%	of	attorneys	work	in	firms	with	more	than	100	lawyers,	according	to	the	ABA.”).	310.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	97-102.	311.	 See,	e.g.,	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	29.	312.	 See	supra	Part	II.A.1.	313.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.2.b.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1431	Further,	the	variables	in	the	Lawyer’s	Guidance	accounting	for	the	differences	in	sizes	among	law	firms	is	vague	and	it	is	unclear	what	 the	 Lawyer’s	 Guidance	 means	 when	 it	 says	 that	 smaller	practices	 can	 take	 into	 account	 their	 smaller	 size	 in	 their	 risk	assessment. 314 	Therefore,	 without	 more	 specific	 language,	 it	 is	likely	 that	 smaller	 practices	 will	 still	 feel	 pressure	 to	 expend	resources	 to	 “over-comply”	 with	 AML	 requirements.	 Further,	 a	significant	number	of	these	smaller	firms	are	solo	law	practices,315	which	would	be	hit	even	harder	by	these	compliance	and	reporting	requirements.316	Beyond	the	financial	costs,	AML	regulations	have	contributed	heavily	 to	 an	 increasing	 trend	 of	 consolidation	 in	 the	 financial	industry,	as	banks	race	to	achieve	efficient	economies	of	scale	to	address	 their	 growing	 regulatory	 burdens. 317 	Pushing	 the	 legal	field	 onto	 the	 same	 path	 of	 mergers	 and	 consolidations	 that	smaller	banks	already	face	could	adversely	impact	the	availability	of	access	to	legal	representation.	Additionally,	banks	already	have	difficulty	 finding	 compliance	 specialists	 to	 work	 in	 their	institutions	 and	 aid	 with	 regulatory	 compliance.318 	It	 would	 be	even	more	difficult	if	the	government	increased	the	demands	for	these	 services	 by	 imposing	 these	 requirements	 on	 many	 more	firms.	Another	significant	cost	would	be	the	cost	of	ambiguity	and	uncertainty	created	by	 implementing	a	regulatory	scheme	based	on	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 Financial	 institutions	 already	 face	 a	regulatory	scheme	in	the	BSA	with	significant	unclarity,	resulting	in	those	institutions	being	assessed	as	deficient	due	to	a	difference	of	opinion	between	a	regulator	and	a	bank	over	how	to	categorize	certain	 risks. 319 	This	 uncertainty	 would	 be	 exacerbated	 by	 the	United	Kingdom’s	approach	because	 it	 is	not	even	clear	who	the	underlying	 Lawyer’s	 Guidance	 covers,	 whereas	 the	 BSA	 more	clearly	delineates	the	covered	entities.320	Specifically,	the	Lawyer’s	Guidance	 defines	 covered	 attorneys	 as	 those	 preparing	 for	 or	
 314.	 See,	e.g.,	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	29.	315.	 See	Grisdela,	supra	note	309.	316.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.2.	317.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	103-05.	318.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	101-02.	319.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	118-21.	320.	 See	 31	 U.S.C.	 §	 5312(a)(2)(2018);	 compare	 Part	 III.B.4,	 with	 31	 U.S.C.	 §	5312(a)(2)	(2018).	
1432	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	carrying	out	a	 specified	activity.321	This	vague	 term	would	 likely	result	in	law	practices	that	would	not	be	considered	to	be	facing	a	significant	 risk	 of	 money	 laundering,	 still	 implementing	 AML	policies	 and	 procedures	 out	 of	 an	 abundance	 of	 caution,	 which	could	 impose	needless	significant	compliance	costs	on	 law	 firms	and	 invade	people’s	privacy	with	no	benefit.322	Further,	 it	means	that	regulators	will	be	able	to	stretch	the	definition	of	which	legal	practitioners	are	covered	by	the	AML	requirements,	allowing	them	to	impose	significant	penalties	and	fines323	on	unsuspecting	legal	professionals	 who	 believed	 they	 were	 not	 covered	 by	 the	regulations.	
C.	Current	Measures	Are	Sufficient	To	Address	AML	Risks	Current	measures	in	place	are	adequate	to	address	AML	risks	for	attorneys.	There	is	a	vast	array	of	criminal	laws,	enforcement	mechanisms,	and	ethical	requirements	that	are	already	in	place	to	deter	 attorneys	 from	 willfully	 facilitating	 money	 laundering	schemes. 324 	Attorneys	 are	 also	 subject	 to	 ethical	 requirements	beyond	 the	 regulatory	 requirements	 already	 imposed	 on	bankers, 325 	which	 makes	 assisting	 a	 client	 in	 laundering	 funds	riskier,	and	subjects	the	attorney	to	more	severe	punishment.	Like	bankers,	 attorneys	 are	 already	 subject	 to	 criminal	 sanction	 for	assisting	money	laundering.326	However,	attorneys	could	also	lose	their	license	to	practice	for	assisting	a	client	in	laundering	funds.327	Therefore,	 there	 are	 enough	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 to	discourage	attorneys	from	willfully	facilitating	money	laundering	and	 additional	 AML	 regulations	 would	 not	 dissuade	 individuals	who	 are	 not	 already	 deterred	 by	 the	 existing	 rules	 and	requirements.	As	for	attorneys	who	unwittingly	assist	in	money	laundering	schemes,	there	is	already	a	standard	in	place	to	ensure	that	lawyers	address	 reasonable	 suspicions	 of	 criminal	 wrongdoing	 by	 their	clients	 and	 ensure	 that	 lawyers	 do	 not	 turn	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	
 321.	 See	supra	Part	III.B.1.	322.	 See	supra	Part	III.B.4.	323.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.2.b.	324.	 See	supra	Part	II.C.1.	325.	 See	supra	Part	II.C.1.	326.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	132-35.	327.	 See	MODEL	RULES	OF	PROF’L	CONDUCT	r.	1.16(a)(1)	(AM.	BAR	ASS’N	1983).	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1433	misconduct.328	Some	attorneys	may	not	have	enough	experience	to	understand	 the	 risks	 created	 by	 clients	 seeking	 to	 use	 their	services	 to	 advance	 a	 money	 laundering	 scheme,	 but	 this	 is	 an	educational	 problem	 that	 the	 Voluntary	 Guidance	was	meant	 to	address. 329 	Imposing	 mandatory	 AML	 regulations	 on	 lawyers	would	 encourage	 them	 to	 better	 understand	 money	 laundering	risks,	 but	 imposing	 burdensome	 regulatory	 obligations	 and	criminal	 sanctions	 is	 not	 a	 cost-effective	 way	 to	 promote	educational	material.	While	 the	ABA’s	efforts	 to	educate	 lawyers	about	the	Voluntary	Guidance	and	money	laundering	risks330	have	not	 yielded	 significant	 results,331	a	more	 targeted	 approach	may	lead	to	more	lawyers	understanding	the	guidance	and	being	able	to	 use	 it	 without	 the	 significant	 costs332 	that	 would	 come	 with	mandatory	 AML	 regulations.	 One	 possible	 solution	 would	 be	 to	require	 lawyers	within	 the	 fields	 of	 the	 specified	 activities333	to	take	 CLE	 credits	 pertaining	 specifically	 to	 AML	 risks	 or	 the	Voluntary	 Guidance.	 This	 would	 also	 fix	 the	 problem	 that	 the	Voluntary	Guidance	itself	is	not	well	known.334	Using	the	Voluntary	Guidance	to	educate	attorneys	about	the	risks	of	money	laundering	from	 clients,335	while	 ensuring	 that	 those	 attorneys	 who	 turn	 a	blind	eye	to	suspicious	clients	are	penalized	appropriately,336	is	a	more	 efficient	 means	 to	 deal	 with	 this	 problem	 than	 imposing	burdensome	 regulatory	 requirements	 on	 law	 firms	 and	 placing	ambiguous	requirements	on	them	that	could	result	 in	significant	penalties.337	Further,	 POCA’s	 balancing	 of	 privilege	 and	 reporting	requirements	 is	 inferior	 to	how	 they	are	balanced	 in	 the	United	States.	 In	 the	United	Kingdom,	 the	standard	 for	when	a	 solicitor	must	report	on	his	client	for	suspected	wrongdoing	does	not	differ	significantly	from	the	standard	imposed	on	American	lawyers.	The	standard	for	solicitors	is	either	“knowing”	or	having	“prima	facie	
 328.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	135.	329.	 See	supra	Part	II.C.3.	330.	 See	supra	Part	II.C.2.	331.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	166.	332.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.2.	333.	 See	Fin.	Action	Task	Force,	supra	note	157,	at	6-7.	334.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	166.	335.	 See	supra	Part	II.C.2.	336.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	133-35.	337.	 See	supra	Part	II.B.2;	see	also	supra	Part	II.B.1.	
1434	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	evidence”	 of	 wrongdoing. 338 	However,	 American	 lawyers	 are	already	under	ethical	requirements	not	to	assist	clients	in	activity	the	lawyers	know	to	be	illicit339	and	could	face	criminal	charges	if	they	turned	a	blind	eye	to	prima	facie	evidence	of	wrongdoing.340	Imposing	a	requirement	to	file	a	SAR	in	this	scenario	while	also	not	“tipping	off”	the	client	to	the	SAR,341	and	at	the	same	time	making	the	 lawyer	 withdraw	 from	 the	 representation342 	would	 impose	contradictory	obligations.	If	a	lawyer	is	required	to	file	a	SAR,	but	then	 tells	 the	 client	 that	 he	 suspects	 wrongdoing	 and	 must	withdraw	 from	 representation,	 then	 the	 lawyer	 has	 effectively	“tipped	off”	 the	 client	 to	 the	existence	of	 a	 likely	SAR	 filing.	The	solution	 would	 be	 to	 either	 force	 the	 lawyer	 to	 continue	representing	 a	 criminal	 client,	 putting	 the	 lawyer	 in	 an	uncomfortable	 and	 costly	 situation,	 or	 force	 the	 lawyer	 to	begin	lying	 to	 clients,	 which	 is	 disruptive	 to	 the	 foundational	 lawyer-client	 relationship.343	Allowing	 a	 lawyer	 to	 tell	 a	 client	 the	 truth	and	withdraw	from	representation344	is	a	better	approach,	both	for	the	lawyer’s	legal	and	ethical	exposure,	and	for	the	protection	of	the	lawyer-client	relationship.	Finally,	 the	 United	 States	 should	 protect	 the	 sanctity	 and	privilege	of	the	lawyer	client	relationship	that	currently	exists.	The	lawyer-client	 confidential	 relationship	 was	 not	 meant	 to	 shield	clients	from	the	law,	but	is	instead	meant	to	promote	client	candor	and	trust	which	is	necessary	for	effective	legal	representation.345	While	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	FATF	both	took	efforts	to	limit	the	breadth	of	AML	 regulations	 to	 limit	 the	 impact	 on	 attorney-client	confidentiality	and	privilege,346	the	regulations	they	created	are	still	 too	vague	and	broad	and	would	chill	 the	attorney-client	relationship.347	Further,	responding	to	the	regulations	necessitates	that	 lawyers	view	 their	 clients	 in	 an	adversarial	nature,	 as	 their	
 338.	 See	Legal	Sector	Affinity	Group,	supra	note	211.	339.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	136-37.	340.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	135.	341.	 See	Terrill,	supra	note	171,	at	448	(citing	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002,	c.	29,	§§	330A(1),	330A(3)	(U.K.)).	342.	 See	MODEL	RULES	OF	PROF’L	CONDUCT	r.	1.16(a)(1)	(AM.	BAR	ASS’N	1983).	343.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	260.	344.	 See	supra	Part	II.C.1.	345.	 See	Kirby,	supra	note	263.	346.	 See	supra	Part	III.B;	see	also	supra	Part	III.A.	347.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	note	261.	
2020]	 THEY'RE	WATCHING	YOU	 1435	interests	 may	 no	 longer	 align,	 which	 only	 reduces	 the	 candor	between	lawyers	and	their	clients.348	There	are	many	valid	reasons	businesses	and	individuals	might	want	privacy	and	confidentiality	ranging	 from	 the	 objectives	 of	 promoting	 business	 to	 simply	protecting	 themselves	 from	 financial	 harm. 349 	The	 government	also	 has	 a	 history	 of	 losing	 sensitive	 data	 to	 hacks	 and	 leaks.350	Even	clients	who	may	be	willing	to	trust	their	attorneys	in	a	more	adversarial	position351	may	be	hesitant	 to	be	as	candid,	knowing	that	 any	 interaction	 could	 end	 up	 in	 a	 government	 database,	subject	to	exposure	by	a	hacker	or	whistleblower.	
V.	CONCLUSION	It	 is	more	 appropriate	 to	 expand	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 ABA	 to	educate	 attorneys	 on	 the	 risks	 of	 facilitating	 money	 laundering	than	 to	 impose	 on	 law	 firms	 costly	 and	 unclear	 regulatory	requirements	that	have	not	been	effective	in	their	use	on	financial	institutions.	Imposing	these	requirements	would	not	address	any	of	 the	 significant	 problems	with	 the	 current	 US	 AML	 regulatory	scheme	and	would	 instead	burden	small	 law	firms	 in	 the	United	States	 that	would	be	unable	 to	cope	with	 the	significant	costs	of	such	a	regulatory	expansion.	Further,	the	fundamental	changes	to	the	 attorney-client	 relationship	 would	 injure	 the	 nature	 of	 the	relationship	with	little	benefit.	Therefore,	the	United	States	should	instead	invest	in	educational	efforts	to	allow	attorneys	to	address	the	risks	of	money	laundering	in	a	more	cost-effective	approach.						
 348.	 See	Kirby,	supra	note	263,	at	310.	349.	 See	Osborne,	supra	note	265,	at	29.			350.	 See	Cybersecurity	Res.	Ctr.,	CyberSecurity	Incidents,	U.S.	OFFICE	OF	PERS.	MGMT.,	https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/	 [perma.cc/UP3F-KFL4]	(last	 visited	 Apr.	 14,	 2020)	 (detailing	 the	 2015	 leak	 of	 “personnel	 data	 of	 4.2	 million	current	and	former	Federal	government	employees.”);	see	also	Deb	Riechmann,	Costs	of	
Snowden	 leak	 still	 mounting	 5	 years	 later,	 AP	 NEWS	 (Jun.	 4,	 2018),	https://www.apnews.com/797f390ee28b4bfbb0e1b13cfedf0593	 [perma.cc/M6MC-78CU]	(discussing	the	breach	of	the	National	Security	Agency	by	Edward	Snowden).	351.	 See	supra	text	accompanying	notes	263-64.	
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